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ABSTRACT 
  This thesis considers the relation of similarity and difference in the comparative study 
of religion, by examining the doctrines of avatara and incarnation.  These doctrines are first 
considered using a comparative approach, summarizing some of the research that has been done 
in the general area of avatara and incarnation.  A more systematic approach follows, examining 
the understanding of incarnation in the work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Sri Aurobindo.  The 
focus is on the differences between these two thinkers, especially in terms of particularity and 
universality and in terms of the purpose of incarnation.  Similarity arises, though, as both 
Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer move from the presence of God in humanity to a sense of solidarity 
with humanity.  Aurobindo’s understanding and Bonhoeffer’s understanding result in the view 
that the Divine is present in the world.  This breaking down of the duality between God and the 
world heightens the sense of solidarity in each thinker’s work, as each one speaks of the presence 
of Christ or the Divine in the community and in the neighbour.   
This study demonstrates the interplay between similarity and difference in the 
comparative study of religion.  Beginning with the seemingly similar ideas of avatara and 
incarnation, it then focuses on the difference between these ideas, returning to similarity as the 
notion of solidarity is introduced.  In the similarity and difference between avatara and 
incarnation, solidarity itself appears to have a mediating role.  It allows for the claim that there is 
common ground to begin with, and when differences are discovered or brought together, 
solidarity with the other keeps difference from becoming division.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Posing the Question 
Should the comparative study of religion focus on similarity or difference?   
To pay attention to similarity would appear to be the positive option, for this seems to 
reinforce the notion that the key to understanding between peoples is the recognition of what is 
held in common – common humanity, common needs for safety and community, common 
longing for ‘security,’ and common strivings for things that we name ‘fulfillment’ or 
‘satisfaction’ or contentment.  This search for what is common expresses itself in religious 
understandings as well, as conversations about religion often focus on what is common – one 
God, a search for meaning and purpose, and plausible answers to questions posed by suffering 
and death.  
Such searching for the common is well enough intentioned, as it is often seen as a way to 
establish understanding between people.  Partners in dialogue ask, “On what can we agree?”  A 
focus on what is common, though, is also fraught with difficulty; for what is found to be 
common is often little more than what is determined to be the lowest common denominator, and 
one thread in an entire fabric of belief is identified as the most important thing while the rest is 
ignored.  The search for what is common also runs the risk of defining what is common or what 
is most important in terms that are chosen by the one embarking on the search.  So a Christian, 
for instance, might study another religion with the assumption that all religions are proposing an 
answer to the problem of a broken relationship with God, or a Buddhist might approach another 
religion seeking that religion’s response to the question of suffering or of the ultimate nature of 
reality.  The search for what is common always carries with it the risk of casting the world in the 
mould of the seeker, assuming that all people always are asking the same questions, solving the 
same problems, and understanding the world in the same way. 
On the other hand, the search for difference is also fraught with difficulty.  If the world 
appears to be deeply divided along religious or political or economic lines, looking for difference 
can mistakenly be seen as a way to deepen such divides and to emphasize the many ways in 
which people are simply not able to communicate with or understand one another.  In addition, 
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just as the search for similarity can cast the world into the mould of the seeker, the search for 
difference can cast the world, in the seeker’s eyes, into categories of uniqueness,1 superiority and 
inferiority, of strength and weakness, of good and bad; again defining the world in the terms that 
are set by one’s own point of view or one’s own religious tradition.   
Does a focus on difference, though, necessarily lead to this kind of divisive end?  Or does 
an appreciation of difference in fact carry with it the possibility of deeper understanding between 
peoples?  Does it not, in fact, come closer to accomplishing what the most well-meaning search 
for commonality seeks to find:  respect, compassion, co-existence, learning, and acceptance? 
The idea for this thesis was sparked by a growing awareness of the interplay between 
similarity and difference between religious traditions.  Ideas in Hinduism that first struck me as 
strange seemed, at a second look, to be similar to those in the tradition with which I am most 
familiar – Christianity.  The idea of similarity initially drew me into this area of study, but as my 
studies have continued, I have begun to resist the impulse to explore similarity, or to assume that 
similarity somehow points to identity or commonality.  Instead, I have sought to uphold 
difference, partly as a way of trying to arrive at a deeper understanding of the ‘other’ – the other 
idea or, indeed, the other person – and partly as a way of respecting the integrity of the other.  In 
this sense, Carl Olson serves as a helpful guide in the comparative task: 
Within the context of this comparative process of recognizing, identifying, and 
articulating differences, we liberate ourselves by increasing our self-awareness, and we 
liberate the other by letting them be who they are.  If we can recognize the differences 
between their understanding and our own, we are on our way to the termination of 
interpreting the other through our personal mode of understanding and allowing them to 
stand, undistorted by our understanding, in their own authentic mode of being.2  
 
Taking difference seriously, then, is not only an important task for academic study.  It is an 
important consideration in any conversation between those who differ. 
This thesis will seek to make the point that any comparison needs to take seriously and to 
articulate differences between the things being compared and the context in which they are 
                                                            
1 Jonathan Z. Smith, “On Comparison,” Roman Religion, edited by Clifford Ando, 23-38 
(Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 23ff.   Smith distinguishes between difference 
and uniqueness, the latter of which almost inevitably leads to value judgements and claims for 
superiority. 
2 Carl Olson, “Eliade, the Comparative Method, Historical Context, and Difference,” 
Changing Religious Worlds, edited by Bryan Rennie, 59-78(Albany:  State University of New 
York Press, 2001), 75. 
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expressed.  Such a focus, though, does not inevitably need to lead to division, conflict, and 
claims for superiority.  In fact, the opposite is the case: an appreciation of difference is essential 
to a sense of solidarity with the other, and a comparative task that focuses on difference is in fact 
a way that leads to deeper understanding and deeper appreciation of the one whom we might call 
‘other.’  The thesis will argue this point by means of a study of the ideas of incarnation in 
Christianity and the avatara3 in Hinduism, considering them in terms of similarity and, 
especially, difference. 
  
1.2  Similarity and Difference in the Study of Religion 
While studies in religion over the past decade have focused increasingly on difference, 
early theorists tended to focus on similarity or on the search for common roots or a single 
explanation of the origin and the nature of religion.  Durkheim, Freud, and Marx, for example, 
sought to account for religion by way of sociological, psychological, and economic explanations 
respectively.4  Later thinkers, such as John Hick, sought to identify common historical and 
psychological roots, most notably in the area of varieties of beliefs about incarnation.5 Others, 
such as Mircea Eliade, criticized reductionist approaches and proposed that the sacred be treated 
for what it claims to be, something with a life of its own that does not need to resort to reductive 
explanations drawn from other disciplines.6   
In turn, critics of Eliade, such as Jonathan Z. Smith, have accused him of a reductionism 
of his own, claiming that while he does not reduce all religion to a single cause he is still guilty 
of reducing religions to a variety of common themes which display a similarity across religious 
boundaries.  Smith criticizes Eliade’s approach, claiming that it is ahistorical7 and overlooks real 
differences between religious traditions in the search for similarity.8   
                                                            
3 Terms transliterated from Sanskrit, such as avatar or Brahman, will be rendered in 
italics throughout this thesis.  When quoting other sources, the usage of the author being quoted 
will be retained. 
4 See Daniel Pals, Eight Theories of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
for a concise summary of these positions and of the work of Eliade. 
5 See The Myth of God Incarnate, edited by John Hick (London:  SCM Press, 1977). 
6 See Mircea Eliade,  Patterns in Comparative Religion, translated by Rosemary Sheed 
(Cleveland and New York:  World Publishing Company, 1963).  
7 Smith, “Map Is Not Territory,” 23. 
8 Olson, 60. 
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Smith’s critique goes beyond simply being a critique of Eliade, though.  For Smith, if the 
purpose of comparison is to find and compare common features or to discover common origins, 
then the entire comparative enterprise is called into question, for  
similarity and difference . . . are the result of mental operations. . . . Comparison, in its 
strongest form, brings differences together within the space of the scholar’s mind for the 
scholar’s own intellectual reasons.  It is the scholar who makes their cohabitation – the 
‘sameness’ – possible, not ‘natural’ affinities or processes of history.9   
 
The possibility of comparison – indeed, the very existence of something called ‘religion’ that can 
be the object of comparative study10 – is a product of the academic mind which serves academic 
purposes. 
Comparison cannot concern itself with the search for similarities or common origins that 
are only apparent, yet at the same the study of religion cannot simply say that all beliefs are 
‘unique,’11 thus rendering comparison a pointless exercise.  Smith finds the comparative 
enterprise to be of value when it seeks “to explore the dimensions of incongruity that exist in 
religious materials.”12   For Smith, difference is what makes comparison interesting.13 
John Clayton works along similar lines in an article that deals extensively with the Indian 
debating tradition of vada, a tradition that Clayton identifies as taking otherness very seriously 
while also allowing for serious and respectful critique of the position of the other.  In the same 
way that Smith is critical of the search for similarity and common origins, Clayton criticizes 
Hick and also discredits the notion that religions are seeking a common goal:  “The goals aimed 
at are as tradition-specific as the paths taken.  Indeed, the goal is constituted as goal by the path 
                                                            
9 Smith, “On Comparison,” 36. 
10 See Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” Critical Terms for Religious 
Studies, ed. by Mark C. Taylor, 269-284 (Chicago and London:  University of Chicago Press, 
1998). 
11 Smith notes:  “It is as if the only choices the comparativist has are to assert either 
identity or uniqueness, and that the only possibilities for utilizing comparisons are to make 
assertions regarding dependence. In such an enterprise, it would appear, dissimilarity is assumed 
to be the norm; similarities are to be explained as either the result of the ‘psychic unity’ of 
humankind, or the result of ‘borrowing.’”Smith, “On Comparison,” 32-33. 
12 Jonathan Z. Smith, Map is Not Territory:  Studies in the History of Religion (Leiden:  
E.J. Brill, 1978), 293. 
13 Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place (University of Chicago Press, 1987), 14.  Quoted in 
Smith, “On Comparison,” 32. 
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chosen.”14  What Clayton emphasizes is the tradition-specific nature of any religious language, 
noting that “apparently similar language, therefore, can have a dissimilar meaning when used 
within different religious contexts because of the different ways in which such language is 
embedded in individual doctrinal schemes and spiritual practices.”15  Apparent similarity is 
precisely only that – apparent – and a deeper look at “religious contexts” and “doctrinal schemes 
and spiritual practices” will reveal that difference rather than similarity is the norm. 
Clayton does not wish to rule out similarity, though.  He simply does not see it as a 
necessary outcome of the comparative task.  What he calls for is  
a reorientation of the philosophy of religion, away from the pretension of philosophy’s  
providing a common foundation for religious claims and toward the more modest aim of 
philosphy’s providing a common discourse in which the nature of religious difference can 
be clarified. . . . Seeing the difference is the beginning of understanding.16   
 
Like Smith, Clayton sees difference as the thing that makes comparison interesting.   
Finally, Wendy Doniger has been critical of Eliade and those who have followed him, but 
she also sees that critics have been too eager, in the name of difference, to do away with the likes 
of Eliade:  “For postmodernism, sameness is the devil, difference the angel. . . . This is one of the 
many reasons why, in the discipline of the history of religions, universalist comparative studies 
of the sort that Mircea Eliade once made so popular have been, by and large, fired from the 
Western canon.”17  Difference may make comparison interesting, but Doniger insists that 
similarity also allows for understanding things in a different way, and in an even deeper way.  
Further, similarity does not need to be obvious.  It can be sought (or simply suggested) between 
widely different myths, traditions, and beliefs.  For example, she makes thematic connections 
between Shakespeare’s All’s Well that Ends Well and the story of Judah and Tamar in the 
Hebrew Scriptures.18   For Doniger, difference does not suggest isolation or incomparability, and 
hers is an approach that seeks to reconcile similarity and difference:  “I want to make peace 
                                                            
14 John Clayton, “Enlightenment, Pluralism and the Philosophy of Religion,” 
Hermeneutics of Encounter:  Essays in Honour of Gerhard Oberhammer on the Occasion of His 
65th Birthday, edited by Francis S. D’Sa and Roque Mesquita, 35-59 (Vienna:  Gerold and 
Company, 1994), 44.  
15 Clayton, 46. 
16 Clayton, 59 (italics Clayton’s). 
17 Wendy Doniger, “Myths and Methods in the Dark,” The Journal of Religion 76, no. 4 
(1996): 532. 
18 Ibid., 533. 
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between premodern typologies and postmodern différance in comparativism, to bring into a 
single (if not necessarily harmonious) conversation the genuinely different approaches that 
several cultures have made to similar (if not the same) human problems.”19  To rework Smith’s 
notion that difference makes comparison interesting, perhaps it could be said after reading 
Doniger that similarity makes difference interesting. 
 
1.3  Similarity and Difference – Avatar and Incarnation 
This thesis will explore some of these themes of similarity and difference through a 
comparative study of avatara and incarnation.  Doniger suggests that the act of comparison 
involves looking at a myth (or, in this case, at a doctrine) through a microscope and through a 
telescope:  “Through the microscope end . . . we can see the myriad details that each culture, 
indeed each version, uses to bring the story to life . . . . But through the telescope end, we can see 
the unifying themes.”20  For the purposes of this thesis, to engage in the comparison of avatara 
and incarnation is to look through the telescope end and to suggest that there is a unifying theme 
that ties these two together.  To look in detail at particular thinkers, like Aurobindo and 
Bonhoeffer, is to look through the microscope end and to see the difference between the two 
thinkers and the two traditions from which they come.  Rather than privileging either one of 
similarity or difference to the exclusion of the other, I will seek to keep them in tension,21 
considering the interplay between them.22 
 The first step will be a consideration of a variety of approaches to the topic of avatara 
and incarnation.  Throughout this section the themes of similarity and difference will appear 
repeatedly.  Although all of the writers considered will claim to see incarnation and avatara as 
different, some will be seen either to be making a reductive move, tracing the two things to a 
common origin in history or to a common psychological root in human nature.  Others will be 
                                                            
19 Ibid. (italics Doniger’s). 
20 Ibid., 544. 
21 Following Carl Olson:  “Although it is probably not totally possible to overcome one’s 
ethnocentrism, the comparative method does have a useful hermeneutical role to play in 
understanding the religious beliefs, actions, and phenomena connected with the other when it is 
used in such a way that sameness and difference are kept in creative tension with each other 
within an overall historical context.”  Olson, 76. 
22 Or, as Mark C. Taylor suggests, the interplay between “the familiar and the strange.”  
Mark C.  Taylor “Introduction,” Critical Terms in Religious Studies, edited by Mark C. Taylor, 
1-19 (Chicago and London:  University of Chicago Press, 1998), 18. 
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seen to be giving priority to one over the other, such that avatara is evaluated in light of the 
Christian doctrine of incarnation.  This in itself will be a reductive move and one which does not 
give the ‘other’ its due.  Other writers will be shown to be focusing on difference in a variety of 
ways, with some seeking to make that difference into a creative one as they speculate about the 
impact of avatara on Christian doctrine or vice versa.  
 The second part of the thesis will move away from these broadly comparative 
approaches.  In this section the two doctrines will be examined in the work of an individual 
thinker in each tradition, putting off comparison for the time being and taking a more systematic 
approach in order to gain a deeper understanding of the role of the doctrines within their 
respective traditions.  Rather than treating them as reducible to a universally held position, they 
will be seen as functioning in specific ways in the work of these thinkers.  This deeper 
understanding of the doctrines in each instance will highlight their difference from one another, 
suggesting that they are not reducible to a common origin or, if such a suggestion is made, it is 
itself pointless because the roles that they play in their religious traditions are so very different.  
 The two thinkers who will be considered are Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Sri Aurobindo.  
These two have not been chosen because they can somehow be seen to speak on behalf of their 
respective religious traditions. 23   Rather, they have been chosen because each of them 
demonstrates an active engagement with the world and a deep concern about the well-being of 
their nations and their communities.  Their lives demonstrated a strong sense of solidarity with 
those around them; the second part of this thesis will examine the relationship between that sense 
of solidarity and each thinker’s particular understanding of the incarnation of God in the world. 
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to consider the interplay of similarity and difference.  
After spelling out the differences between avatara and incarnation, a point of similarity will 
come into focus – solidarity.  This shift will bring back similarity, not as an a priori matter, but 
rather as a point of arrival, a kind of ‘post-critical’ similarity.  Coming to similarity at this point 
holds the two doctrines in tension, and it will be shown that, even or especially with difference 
                                                            
23 As Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer do not speak for or represent all of Hinduism or 
Christianity respectively, it is also worth noting that neither of these traditions speaks with one 
unified voice on the matters addressed in the discussion of avatara and incarnation.  As the 
differences between Bonhoeffer and Aurobindo will be considered here, it is also the case that a 
comparison of Bonhoeffer with another Christian thinker or Aurobindo with another Hindu 
thinker could prove fruitful.  
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being upheld, difference need not be divisive.  For both doctrines – the Christian doctrine of 
incarnation and the Hindu doctrine of the avatara – contribute to a sense of solidarity with the 
other.  Solidarity becomes a starting point for discussing difference, and it remains a point of 
possible agreement that keeps difference from becoming division.   
 The thesis, then, will begin with an apparent similarity:  The similarity between the 
Christian doctrine of the incarnation of God in Christ and the Hindu understanding of the 
incarnation of God in Krishna.  From here it will move to difference as these two figures and the 
idea of incarnation that they represent are examined more deeply and shown to be very different.  
Finally, the thesis will return to similarity as the different ideas of incarnation are seen to 
encourage similar responses of solidarity in the area of ethics and action.  The flow of the thesis 
is a model of the interplay of similarity and difference. 
9 
 
2.  APPROACHES TO AVATARA AND INCARNATION 
 
 
 
 Of all the material that has been written on the subject of avatara and incarnation, a few 
works stand out as representative of the variety of approaches that have been taken, issues that 
have been raised, and conclusions that have been reached.  We will turn at this point to the works 
of Geoffrey Parrinder, Daniel E. Bassuk, Richard DeSmet, Noel Sheth, Julius Lipner, and 
Regunta Yesurathnam.  It is worth noting that none of these works are written by authors who 
identify themselves as writing exclusively from a Hindu perspective1.  
 
2.1  Geoffrey Parrinder 
 In Avatar and Incarnation,2 Parrinder calls into question the easy “approximation or 
identification” of the concepts of avatara and incarnation, and instead sets out to explore the 
question of how much or how little ground exists between the two concepts.3 As he notes 
similarities and differences Parrinder is not interested in seeking any sort of a “lowest common 
denominator,” something which he sees, for example, in the work of Radhakrishnan.4  Instead, 
what he seeks to do is to clarify similarities and differences, and to do this he looks at the history 
of the avatara doctrine and at broad themes within the doctrine.   
 Parrinder’s work displays a breadth of knowledge of the history and the diversity of 
belief in the avatara.  While most of his discussion focuses on the Krishna avatara, he devotes 
attention to Shaiva movements as well,5 and to the role of the Rama avatara in the Ramayana.6  
                                                            
1 There does indeed seem to be comparatively little written about avatara and incarnation 
from a Hindu perspective.  Without further study of the reasons behind that observation – study 
which will not be undertaken at this time -  one can only speculate that the whole question of the 
comparison of these two is a more pressing matter for Christians or, at least, “Westerners,” for 
whom the historicity and the particularity of Jesus Christ play a more decisive role.  If, in some 
schools of Hindu thought and belief, Christ can be numbered as just one of many avataras, 
issues of uniqueness and universality do not command such immediate attention.  
2 Geoffrey Parrinder, Avatar and Incarnation:  The Wilde Lectures in Natural and 
Comparative Religion in the University of Oxford  (London:  Faber and Faber, 1970). 
3 Ibid., 13.  
4 Ibid., 267. 
5 Ibid., “Similarity and Opposition,” 87ff. 
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As he develops his treatment of Krishna, he draws on popular traditions, the classical 
philosophers, poets and Upanishads, and modern thinkers such as Gandhi, Radhakrishnan, and 
Sri Aurobindo.  The picture that is painted in Parrinder’s work is a complex one, bringing to light 
a multi-faceted world of belief and practice surrounding the avatar. 
 The breadth of Parrinder’s work is also what makes the work problematic at times.  In 
considering the doctrines of avatara and incarnation, Parrinder casts his net so wide as to lose 
focus.  For example, “Buddhas, Jinas, and Sufis”7 makes for interesting reading, but it has the 
character more of an appendix, an interesting afterthought, than of a crucial piece of Parrinder’s 
argument.  The work seems to be a collection of interesting snapshots of moments in the history 
and the relationship of avatara and incarnation.  Apart from general assertions that the two 
cannot be equated, Parrinder’s work does not seek to say much more than that they appear 
similar but are different.   
 The chief problem of Parrinder’s work begins to appear in his treatment of the Christian 
doctrine of incarnation.  The difficulty is twofold.  First, the Christian doctrine of incarnation 
receives an overly simplified treatment.  It has already been noted that Parrinder devotes detailed 
study to the history of avatara doctrines in their breadth and complexity, and this is a strength of 
the work.  A similar treatment of the breadth and complexity of Christian notions of incarnation 
is missing, however, and Christianity is presented as having a very uniform view of incarnation, 
unlike the rich and variegated (and conflicted) view of incarnation that his reading of Hindu 
views of the avatara suggests.  Rather than being an omission, this simplicity reflects an 
assumption that Christianity is somehow normative in the same way for all Christians, setting a 
univocal standard by which the doctrine of another tradition can be judged. 
   Second, this over-simplification of Christian tradition allows Parrinder to make 
sweeping claims in favour of the Christian notion of incarnation.  If the Christian doctrine is seen 
as relatively uncomplicated, it becomes easier to use it as a standard by which to evaluate the 
other.  So, for instance, the avatara is “weak” in “humanity and history,”8 and Christ is credited 
with a certain “moral superiority.”9 While Parrinder rightly points out that Christian thought is 
more concerned than Hindu thought is with history as understood in the West, he seems to see 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 Ibid., “Avatar in Rama,: 63 ff. 
7 Ibid., “Buddhas, Jinas, and Sufis,” 131-205. 
8 Ibid., 226. 
9 Ibid., 235. 
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this as elevating the incarnate one of Christianity above the avatara of Hinduism:  “In so far as 
the historical words and deeds of the Saviour can be established so much less can their contents 
be distorted by inferior imitators.”10  The historicity of the Incarnate One of Christianity is not 
treated simply as an observation of difference; it comes to be treated as a mark of superiority.11   
 Similarly, Parrinder evaluates other non-Christian traditions based upon his Christian 
notions of orthodoxy, even using terms for what the majority Christian tradition has identified as 
heresy to characterize elements within these traditions.  So he discusses the “docetism” that 
pervades Buddhism, and the “adoptionism” that characterizes Islam’s position, criticizing these 
positions on the basis of terms which could be said to carry only negative baggage from the 
Christian point of view. 
 Throughout the work, such bias does not show itself in the form of antipathy toward the 
traditions that Parrinder studies.  It is, rather, simply an assumption that shows itself often, 
perhaps unwittingly,12 and seemingly with gracious intent:  So followers of other religions are 
“our brothers in faith. . . . [and] Christ is present to true believers by grace.”13  Parrinder is 
certainly conscious of and ready to acknowledge difference.  The difficulty in his work seems to 
be that the West is seen as the gracious perspective which will embrace and swallow up that 
difference.   
 This is seen once more as Parrinder sees Christ as “completing” and “opening a new 
way.”14  He characterizes this “new way” as a way in which love and suffering are key, which in 
itself could stand as a very significant observation about what it is that is unique to most 
Christian notions of incarnation – the presence of suffering in the life and death of the incarnate 
one.  When this observation is coupled with Parrinder’s comments about “completion,” however, 
                                                            
10 Ibid., 263. 
11 This criticism of Parrinder is also made by Bassuk (cf. Daniel E. Bassuk, Incarnation 
in Hinduism and Christianity: The Myth of the God-Man,  Foreword by Robert S. Ellwood.  
(Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1987), 50.). 
12 It is possible that even someone like Parrinder, widely regarded as a great 
comparativist, has difficulty in acknowledging the perspective from which he speaks and 
speaking from that perspective in a “self-conscious” manner. 
13 Parrinder., 269.  This perspective is similar to that of Karl Rahner, particularly his idea 
of “anonymous Christianity.”  For a concise introduction to this idea, see Karl Rahner, 
“Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions,” in Theological Investigations, Vol. 5, 115-134 
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1966).  
14 Parrinder, 279. 
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the observation moves beyond description and becomes evaluative.  Suffering provides what 
other traditions have all been lacking; hence this way is the one that completes all the others.  
This is one of the major flaws of Parrinder’s work:  Difference leads all too readily to evaluation.   
 In noting differences, he does tend towards an evaluation of such differences in favour 
of Christianity.  In noting similarity, however, he avoids this.  So, for example, while he notes 
the ways in which the difference between avatara and incarnation reflect a difference between 
the Indian (cyclical) and Western (linear) views of time and history, he also downplays the 
significance of this difference, noting that even if the avatara appears repeatedly, each avatara is 
“the incarnation for the age.”15  The avatara and Christ, then, take on roles of comparable 
singularity and significance for those who are their followers.   
 Perhaps the most notable similarity – if it can be called a similarity – arises when 
Parrinder discusses death and resurrection.  To be sure, his discussion uses terms from the 
Christian tradition, and this highlights the difference between the two.  This difference, though, 
leads to a common observation of the two, namely that death and resurrection are required of 
both Christianity and Hinduism.16  While Parrinder’s work is somewhat tainted by a kind of 
assumption of superiority for Christianity, he sees Christianity’s own terms referring back to 
itself and calling forth its own need for rebirth and reform.  Speaking in this way about the life of 
Christianity, one wonders whether Parrinder would be comfortable making the same point using 
the Hindu notions of dying and rebirth, a repeated event.  Perhaps such imagery would even 
better suit the story of Christianity, since the call to “reform” and “rebirth” is one that has echoed 
in the life of Christianity throughout all of its history. 
 
2.2  Daniel E. Bassuk 
 In Incarnation in Hinduism and Christianity: The Myth of the God-Man,17 Daniel E. 
Bassuk seeks to examine similarity and difference in the doctrines of avatara and incarnation in 
as unbiased a manner as possible:  “Without making any value judgements on the intrinsic merit 
or reality of the God-man’s existence or achievements, this book elucidates how the God-men of 
                                                            
15 Ibid., 235.  This will also be noted several years later in an article by Julius Lipner (see 
below, 25). 
16 Ibid., 276. 
17 See above, p. 11, n. 11. 
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Hinduism and Christianity are similar yet demonstrably different.”18  Although the subject matter 
is similar to Parrinder’s, Bassuk’s approach is significantly different.  He searches through the 
sources to find the roots of what came to be the more developed doctrines of avatara and, later 
on in the book, incarnation.  Beginning with Vedic literature, he surveys the classical avatars, 
ranging from the classical enumeration of the ten avatars of Vishnu to some of the broader lists 
given, for example, in the Bhagavata Purana.  He notes similarities along the way,19 but sees 
problems arising as the two traditions, Hinduism and Christianity, become more acquainted with 
each other.  By the nineteenth century, Westerners are seen to be making claims that Krishna is 
simply a “corruption” of Christ, and Hindu writers in turn are suggesting that Christ could only 
be Rama or Krishna.20  Bassuk is quick to downplay any such claims of influence in either 
direction, asserting instead that the different historical consciousness of each tradition makes 
such influence highly unlikely. 
 Following the discussion of the classical avatars, Bassuk considers the case of six 
modern avatars,21 from Chaitanya (1486-1533) through to Satya Sai Baba (1926-202222).  What 
is most interesting about Bassuk’s observations is that, by the time of the last of the six he 
considers, there is in fact an identification of the avatar and Christ, as Satya Sai Baba “claims to 
be a reincarnation of the historical Jesus.”23 
 The second section of Bassuk’s book is entitled “The God-Man in the West,” in which 
he examines “certain transformations which the avatar concept underwent as it was transplanted 
to the West.”24  Here again, Bassuk’s view is broad, moving from figures such as Thoreau and 
Emerson through movements such as the Theosophical Society, the Self-Realization Society, the 
Hare Krishna Movement, the Baha’i Faith, the English Avatar Movement, and concluding with a 
                                                            
18 Bassuk, 10-11.  “God-man” and “God-men” will be standard terms used by Bassuk 
throughout the work to refer to avatars and incarnate beings. 
19 Noting, for instance, a similarity between some elements of the Book of Revelation and 
the myth of the Kalkin avatar.  Cf. Ibid., 45ff. 
20 Ibid., 47ff. 
21 Ibid., “Modern Avatars of India,” 51-96. 
22 The year 2022 is the date that Satya Sai Baba himself has identified as the date of his 
death.  Ibid., 87. 
23 Ibid., 96. 
24 Ibid., 105. 
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brief foray into science fiction.25  Bassuk makes the interesting observation that what begins as 
the introduction of the avatar Krishna into western society changes into an understanding of 
avatarhood in which Christ has become the centre: 
The avatar concept, born and bred in India, has become a radically transformed cross-
cultural phenomenon.  The supreme position of Krishna has been replaced in the west 
by Christ, who is regarded as the full and complete Avatar, an Avatar of love, a saviour 
figure, and a Son of God.  The Avatar has been transmogrified and its image has 
become inextricably interwoven with the cultural horizon in which it is found.26 
 
 Bassuk moves on from here to a consideration of the history of the doctrine of 
incarnation in Christianity.  The historical development is not given nearly as thorough a 
treatment as that given to the avatar doctrine, but the treatment is similar and is more 
comprehensive than Parrinder’s.  Bassuk traces the roots of incarnation far back into Ancient 
Near Eastern history and mythology, finding in Greek myth and poetry, in Egyptian mystery 
religion, and even in the claims of Alexander the Great much of the raw material that would go 
into the making of the Christian myth of the God-Man.  All of this provides evidence enough for 
Bassuk to claim that a “mythology of descending gods who appear on earth had already been 
used to interpret the lives of historical figures and existed early enough to be available for 
Christian appropriation.”27 
 Referring to the work of Michael Goulder,28 Bassuk builds his argument further through 
considerations of the work of St. Paul, (who is seen to be appropriating themes of incarnation 
from Samaritan mythology29), early Christian writers, writers throughout the history of 
Christianity (Thomas Aquinas30 and Rudolf Bultmann, for example), and modern day claimants 
to divine status, such as Reverend Sun Myung Moon.  Throughout this section, Bassuk works 
                                                            
25 Considering the works of Poul Anderson, Roger Zelazny, Frank Herbert and Michael 
Moorcock.  Ibid., 152 ff. 
26 Ibid., 156. 
27 Ibid., 165. 
28 Cf. Michael Goulder, “Jesus, The Man of Universal Destiny,” in John Hick, The Myth 
of God Incarnate, 48-63; and Goulder, “The Two Roots of the Christian Myth,”  in Hick, 64-86. 
29 Bassuk, 168 ff. 
30 Bassuk, DeSmet, Sheth, and Lipner (see below, 17ff, 20ff, 23 ff) all make reference to 
Thomas Aquinas on the question of avatars, noting that Aquinas himself thought it quite possible 
that there could have been multiple incarnations, and that any member of the Trinity could have 
become incarnate in a multitude of forms at a multitude of times.  As it is, though, Aquinas 
concludes that it is proper that only the Son became incarnate at one time.  Cf. Quenton 
Quesnell, “Aquinas on Avatars,” Dialogue & Alliance 1, no. 2 (Sum 1987), p 33-42.    
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with an understanding that the historical and the mythological are brought together in sacred 
texts.  The New Testament itself, and of course the image of Jesus that is presented therein, is 
seen to be modulating “between history and myth,”31 and these are themes picked up throughout 
the history of Christian thought.32  
 What is most interesting is the direction that Bassuk’s work takes as his study 
concludes.  He has traced the development of avatar doctrine in the East and of the doctrine of 
the incarnation in the West.  He has seen the avatar taking root in the west, and has made the 
interesting observation that over time and over the course of the move to the west the avatar 
comes to be more closely identified with Christ.  He does not, at this point, see the two having a 
common origin – in fact, he is at pains to point out that Christianity and Hinduism develop 
independently,33 and he notes five important distinctions, named as pairs, between the two:34 
1)  Soul and sole:  the oneness of the individual soul with the supreme soul, and Christ as the 
sole incarnation;  
2)  The serpent as good and evil (this seems to be a stretch for Bassuk, as he seems to be 
suggesting that the image of the serpent is of equal importance in both traditions, a suggestion 
that seems unlikely);35 
3)  Reincarnation and Resurrection:  the two traditions have very different understandings of 
death and (re)birth, hence the God-men of these traditions play very different roles; 
4)  Baba and Abba:  The notion of the avatar as ‘Baba,’ father, as distinct from the notion of God 
as ‘abba’ (Aramaic “father”) of the incarnate one; 
5)  Hindu Love and Christian Love:  “Abba, the Christian God, loves to save; Baba, the Hindu 
Avatar, saves who love.”36 
                                                            
31 Bassuk, 172. 
32 One wonders at this point whether Bassuk is being anachronistic, reading a modern 
distinction between the realm of history and myth into first century works written in a milieu that 
very likely did not hold to such a distinction. 
33 Ibid., 49. 
34 Ibid., 183 ff. 
35 Julius Lipner makes the argument that items to be compared need to be similar in terms 
of “priority status,” that is, they need to be of similar importance within the traditions being 
compared for the comparison to be valid.  Using this criterion, it seems like a considerable 
stretch to claim that the image of the serpent has a similar priority status for Hinduism and 
Christianity. Cf. Julius Lipner,  “Avatara and Incarnation?”, Re-visioning India’s Religious 
Traditions: Essays in Honour of Eric Lott, edited by David C. Scott and Israel Selvanayagam, 
127-143  (Bangalore:  I.S.P.C.K., 1996), 129.  
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 Having noted these differences, though, Bassuk does begin to make the move of 
claiming a common origin as he concludes his work in the Epilogue.37   He begins to show his 
hand in this regard even near the beginning of the work as he poses the question, “From within 
what perspective of divine-human relationships does the belief in the God-man originate and 
operate?”38  The entire work moves toward a similar conclusion, that the notions of avatar and 
incarnation are rooted in archetypes, they are patterns abstracted from events, “certain events 
[which] lend themselves to immortalization.”39  Finally, looking even beyond the notion of the 
archetype, Bassuk suggests that both avatara and incarnation have their roots in a basic human 
need:   
We humans take delight in the idea of a divine visitation, a divine descent, whether it be 
Superman, an Avatar, or an Incarnation, because we would really like to see something 
of God. . . . Avatarization and incarnation are both aspects of the mythicization process 
and are rooted in that matrix.40   
 
 In the end, it appears that Bassuk has two ways of understanding similarity and 
difference in the doctrines of avatar and incarnation.  Considered synchronically, the difference 
is very real and needs to be maintained:  If we isolate each of the doctrines in their context, they 
are clearly not the same thing.  The diachronic view points to a different conclusion, however, 
for as Bassuk considers the doctrines in terms of their historical development he sees both rooted 
in the myth-making process, which itself grows out of a simple common human desire to see 
God.  With his interesting conclusion that the avatar Krishna in the west has given way to the 
avatar Christ,41 he even seems to see similarity arising at “this end” of the synchronic view, at 
least in the Western world. 
 
 Both Parrinder and Bassuk take very broad approaches to the subject matter, and each 
one seeks to hold the doctrines of avatara and incarnation somewhat at a distance (although one 
might argue that Parrinder shows a bias in favour of the Christian doctrine at times.).  Neither 
one takes an approach that gives much consideration to the importance of avatara and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
36 Bassuk, 191. 
37 Ibid., 192-198. 
38 Ibid., 2. 
39 Ibid., 192. 
40 Ibid., 194. 
41 Cf. above, p. 14, n. 26. 
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incarnation in their respective religious traditions.  In other words, not much attention is given to 
questions of the significance of the avatar for the devotee of Krishna or of the incarnate God for 
the Christian.  
 A number of shorter works will begin to turn our attention to questions such as these.  
Each of the following works offers a more focused look at the topic than either Parrinder or 
Bassuk, and each of them, intentionally or perhaps unintentionally, raises issues that are 
significant in considering the importance of the doctrines under considerations for believers in 
each tradition.   
 
2.3  Richard DeSmet 
 In the essay “Jesus and the Avatara,”42 Richard DeSmet offers a brief and focused 
perspective on the avatara doctrine, particularly as it appears in the person of Krishna in the 
Bhagavad Gita.  Central to his discussion of the avatar Krishna in the Gita is the Sankhya nature 
of Krishna and the ways in which that nature compares with the nature of Christ. 
 DeSmet begins with the origin of the Bhagavad Gita, which he sees as having come into 
being in response to the “crisis” of the spread of Buddhism and Jainism; a crisis which presented 
two options for the religious thinker:  to adopt the new way, with its focus on non-violence, 
ultimate salvation, and renunciation; or to remain faithful to the old ways of Brahmanism, caste 
duty (including the duty of the warrior), and the strict following of dharma?  In response to this 
dilemma, “a man of genius . . . conceived a bridge-teaching which would resolve the dilemma by 
adequately merging the ideals and virtues of the old and the new religions.”43  This same “man of 
genius” needed a herald and teacher of dharma who would embody the best traits of the great 
teachers of the newly-arising traditions.  The teacher and the framework for the teaching found a 
perfect home in the Mahabharata, the great Indian Epic, in which a “new episode” – the 
Bhagavad Gita – was inserted, and whose great charioteer Krishna was adopted as the 
authoritative and divine central figure, the descended God, the avatar.  For DeSmet, Krishna the 
avatar  is fabricated in response to a need, and DeSmet is quick to characterize the Mahabharata 
                                                            
42 Richard De Smet, “Jesus and the Avatara,” Jerald Gort, Hendrik Vroom, Rein 
Frenhout, and Anton Wessels, editors,  Dialogue and Syncretism: An Interdisciplinary 
Approach, 153-162 (Grand Rapids:  Eerdmans, 1989). 
43 Ibid., 154. 
18 
 
as a “highly creative piece of literary fiction.”44  In itself, this may or may not pose a problem 
from the perspective of scholarship, but it may pose difficulties in light of later moves in the 
article, moves which take DeSmet’s article beyond comparison and into the realm of evaluation.   
 The article’s treatment of Krishna focuses on sankhya ontology and on Krishna’s 
status within this ontology.45  The sankhya view of human nature does not suggest that purusha 
and prakriti unite to form a true human nature.  Rather, they only come near to each other in the 
human being.  Purusha resides in prakriti and illumines it, but the two are never united in what 
one could call a united “human nature” that stands on its own as a unified entity.  Sankhya 
ontology does not allow for what western thought sees as a united human nature, so Krishna 
cannot be seen (from a western perspective) as having taken on human nature.  In this case, 
claims DeSmet, “we cannot say that the Lord took up a human nature with consequences which 
extend to the whole human genus.  [God’s] union with (a human body) is not hypostatic, but 
manifestative, or at most instrumental.”46  Since the underlying understandings of human nature 
are different, Krishna cannot be said to have taken on human nature in the same way that Christ 
may be spoken of within Christianity as having taken on human nature. 
 It is indeed interesting that DeSmet focuses on Krishna in terms of this sankhya 
anthropology, and that he relates this to the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christian 
doctrine.  The comparison is interesting in that it views both figures – the avatar Krishna and the 
incarnate Christ – in terms of understandings found within each respective tradition.  In this way, 
DeSmet’s comparison sheds clear light on an important difference between Krishna and Christ.   
At several points in the article, however, it appears that DeSmet sees the avatar as 
somehow falling short of the incarnate one of Christianity.  Like Parrinder and Bassuk, he 
devotes very little attention to any development of the Christian doctrine of incarnation.47  Even 
so, he feels justified in making claims such as the following:  “To sympathetic Christians, 
                                                            
44 Ibid., 155. 
45 Ibid., 155-159.  Sankhya is a type of dualist realism.  For an introduction to this school 
of thought, see Samkhyakarika, 4th ed., trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of 
Madras, 1948), and G.J. Larson, Classical Samkhya: an Interpretation of Its History and 
Meaning (Delhi:  Motilal Banarsidass, 1979).  
46 DeSmet, 159. 
47 To be fair to DeSmet, it should be noted that he assumes that the reader already has a 
reasonably thorough knowledge of these matters (153).  However, the non-critical view of the 
“incarnation side” of the comparison lends it a certain amount of credibility as the assumed norm 
against which avatara is measured. 
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[avatara] is fascinating as the closest pre-figuration in another religion of the incarnation central 
to their own religion.”48  To suggest that the avatar is a pre-figuration – particularly a pre-
figuration of a figure from another religious tradition – is to suggest that the avatar is 
incomplete, awaiting fulfillment in another to come.  Earlier in the article, DeSmet had already 
implied that the Hindu perspective is missing something that the Christian perspective provides: 
“the Gita is unacquainted with what Christ was to reveal: that the incarnate God is better seen in 
the humblest and most despised.”49  Clarification of difference begins to give way to notions of 
inferiority and incompleteness.   
 In the concluding remarks on similarities and differences,50 some interesting similarities 
are noted:  both Krishna and Jesus are “generated by a free initiative of divine power;” their lives 
take the shape of regular human lives (they are born, they work, they teach, and so on), and the 
motive for the incarnation of each is the compassion of God.  However, the same inclination seen 
above – the inclination to see Christ as the fulfillment of what in Krishna is incomplete – appears 
as the comparison continues:   
Krishna’s efficacy reaches only his devotees; that of Christ even his enemies…. [Only] 
Christ teaches that the service of the Lord cannot be true apart from love for one’s (even 
inimical) neighbour. . . . Krishna dies, but does not rise in a glorious humanity.  Christ 
does rise from the dead in a glorious body, a living promise of our own glorious 
resurrection in him.51   
 
DeSmet (like Parrinder at times) has difficulty allowing comparison to stand without becoming 
evaluation.  His work has the benefit of displaying a rich understanding of the sankhya view of 
human nature, and this makes for some interesting comparison between the doctrines of avatara 
and incarnation.  He also does suggest that the study of avatara doctrine can be of great value for 
Christians,52 but he does not spell out what that value might be.  Despite the strengths of the 
essay, the tendency to see incarnation as the fulfillment of avatara doctrine seems difficult for 
DeSmet to shake.  Difference is clearly acknowledged and articulately expressed.  Yet difference 
gives way to an evaluative comparison, with Christianity appearing in the more favourable light. 
  
                                                            
48 Ibid., 161. 
49 Ibid., 156. 
50 Ibid., 161-162. 
51 Ibid., 162. 
52 Ibid., 153. 
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2.4  Noel Sheth 
 Noel Sheth takes a broad and nuanced approach in his article “Hindu Avatara and 
Christian Incarnation: A Comparison.”53  Like DeSmet, from the very beginning of the article 
Sheth proceeds with the understanding that the comparison of avatara and incarnation stands to 
benefit Hindu and Christian alike:   
Such comparison not only facilitates better mutual understanding but also helps each 
tradition to understand itself better….The similarities with other traditions help us to 
appreciate the larger significance of our beliefs and practices, and the differences give 
us insights into the unique features of our own tradition.54   
 
With such an introduction, one would expect Sheth to pay close attention to the doctrine of each 
tradition under consideration, and this is in fact what he does.  He begins with a survey of the 
development of the avatara doctrine, in which he treats the doctrine as rich and multifaceted, 
developing in many directions and understood in a variety of ways throughout the Hindu 
tradition.  He identifies the Bhagavad Gita as the source of the first formulation of the doctrine, 
but beyond this he is diligent in pointing out the variety of perspectives that exist in belief in the 
avatara.55  Pancaratra doctrine and Nimbarka doctrine, the perspectives of the Gita and the 
Puranas, Bengal Vaishnavism with its belief that Krishna is the source of all the avatars 
(including Vishnu!),56 along with the examples of founders of sects and modern day saints who 
come to be seen as avatars – all of these become examples of the richness of perspectives on 
avatarhood that exist within Hindu tradition. 
 In addition to noting the diversity within Hinduism itself, Sheth points out the variety of 
perspectives on the development of avatara doctrine that have arisen in Western and non-
Vaishnava circles.57   Sheth demonstrates that there is no single perspective on avatarhood from 
the perspective of either Hinduism or of non-Hindu scholarship. 
                                                            
53 Noel Sheth, S.J., “Hindu Avatara and Christian Incarnation:  A Comparison.”  In 
Philosophy East and West, Vol. 52, Number 1 (January 2002): 98-125. 
54 Ibid., 98. 
55 Ibid, 99ff. 
56 Ibid., 100. 
57 As examples, Sheth refers to three theories that have been proposed:  Vishnuization (an 
avatar, such as the fish, comes to be seen as an incarnation of Vishnu only later in the tradition), 
Apotheosis (a human hero is later divinized), and Composite personality (For example, Krishna 
the child, the lover, and the hero – three different Krishnas - are combined into one “composite 
personality.”).  Ibid., 101. 
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 What distinguishes Sheth’s approach from those of Parrinder, Bassuk, and DeSmet is 
that Sheth continues on from this point to give equal treatment to the development of the 
Christian doctrine of incarnation, a doctrine which is shown to be as nuanced and multi-faceted 
as the avatara doctrine.  Just as the Hindu sources present many different pictures of Krishna 
(and other avatars), so also the New Testament presents a variety of perspectives on Christology, 
ranging from what Sheth characterizes as the high Christology of Paul to the lower Christology 
of Acts.58  From this point Sheth traces the development of Christological doctrine through two 
schools of thought (the Alexandrian and Antiochean),59 which are eventually synthesized in the 
notion of hypostatic union, articulated by the Council of Chalcedon.60 Before and after 
Chalcedon, perspectives arose which were judged heretical by the church,61 and even within the 
orthodox mainstream of Christianity understandings of the incarnation continue to evolve over 
time, resulting in what Sheth sees today as the widespread adoption of a more characteristically 
Protestant Christology that focuses on the work of Christ (as opposed to a medieval Catholic 
scholastic view that focuses more on the being of Christ.).   
 As a result of this, claims Sheth, “the hypostatic union is now being reinterpreted in 
relational and Trinitarian terms.  Unlike in medieval times, the relation of Jesus to his Father is 
more important than the relation of his humanity to his divinity.”62  As a result of this relational 
interpretation, contemporary Christian thought is dealing more with themes of Jesus’ 
significance for the poor, for women, for the environment, and for interreligious dialogue. 63 
                                                            
58 Ibid. 
59 According to Sheth, the Alexandrian school emphasized the divine Word (logos) and 
“underplayed” the humanity of Christ, while the Antiochean emphasized the full humanity of 
Christ, somewhat at the expense of the unity of Christ’s two natures.  Ibid., 101-102. 
60 In the year 451 C.E.  Ibid., 102 
61 Sheth summarizes these on page 104 as positions that either “challenge or diminish 
Jesus’ full humanity,” “deny the divinity of Christ,” or “do not maintain the hypostatic union.” 
62 Ibid., 103. 
63 See, for example, Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation:  History, Politics, and 
Salvation, revised ed., translated and edited by Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson 
(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1988); Sallie McFague, Models of God:  Theology for an Ecological, 
Nuclear Age (Philadelphia:  Fortress Press, 1987); Pamela Dickey Young, Christ in a Post-
Christian World (Minneapolis:  Fortress Press, 1995); Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, and the 
Trinity (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001); John B. Cobb, Jr. and Christopher Ives, ed., The 
Emptying God:  A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation (Maryknoll, N.Y.:  Orbis, 1990). 
22 
 
 Sheth’s treatment of the doctrine of incarnation is significant in that it does not treat 
Christian doctrine as an assumed norm against which other traditions are to be measured.  Nor 
does it treat Christian doctrine in general, and incarnational doctrine in particular, as something 
that is understood and interpreted by all Christians in the same way.  This upholding of the 
diversity within both Hindu and Christian traditions also affects the flavour of Sheth’s 
comparison and his conclusions regarding similarity and difference in the doctrines of avatara 
and incarnation. 
 Sheth notes that both doctrines lend themselves well to an engagement with the world:   
Both the avatara and the incarnation are immanent. . . . They reveal God’s personal 
love and concern. . . . In both cases, the descent of God enables human beings to ascend 
to God.  Human beings are raised to a higher dignity; they are divinized in Hinduism 
and made adopted children of God in Christianity. 
Both conceptions give importance to the world and justify selfless involvement in the 
world, rather than renunciation of the world.64 
 
Having noted this positive similarity, Sheth also points out a negative implication of this same 
similarity, noting that both Hinduism and Christianity have made use of the avatar and Christ to 
shore up the reigning powers over against those who are weaker or regarded as inferior.65 
 Differences are presented throughout the article as being nuanced, and never absolute.66  
For example, the multiple appearances of the avatar are unique to Hinduism, yet similar (if not 
identical) themes can be seen, for example, in the theophanies of the Old Testament, or in 
Christ’s post-resurrection appearances or the doctrine of the second coming of Christ.  At the 
same time, while the one-time-only incarnation is unique to Christianity, a kind of particularity 
can be seen in Hinduism in, for example, certain understandings that one avatar is the incarnation 
of Vishnu, or that an avatar appears and is the avatar for that age.  The difference remains, but 
there is still room to consider similarity. 
 In addition to the nuanced nature of difference, Sheth notes two other differences.  First, 
the differences are due to contrasting worldviews.67  What this observation does is remove the 
question of evaluation from the comparison (as distinct from, for example, Parrinder, who 
                                                            
64 Sheth, 104. 
65 Ibid., 105. 
66 Ibid., 106 ff. 
67 “It makes sense to have many and repeated avataras in a cyclic worldview, and 
similarly one sees the point in the incarnation taking place once and for all in a linear 
worldview.”  Ibid., 113. 
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evaluates the avatara doctrine as lacking in historicity and, therefore, lacking in veracity).68  
Second, the doctrines, with their differences, are seen to be complementary and mutually 
challenging.  Even the elements within each tradition that make them most unique – the avatar’s 
stated purpose of the restoration of dharma, and the importance of Christ as “the suffering 
Savior”69 – can complement the faith and understanding of Christians and Hindus:   
[T]he strong emphasis on the reestablishment of righteousness in the avatara stories can 
give greater encouragement to Christian liberation theologians in their quest to discover 
liberative elements in Christ’s incarnation. . . . On the other hand, the distinctive 
emphasis on the suffering Saviour in Christianity can be an inspiration for Hinduism to 
discover the redemptive and healing values of self-suffering.... Mahatma Gandhi 
integrated this Christian understanding of suffering into his theory and practice of non-
violence (ahimsa).70 
 
 Sheth’s nuanced approach to avatara and incarnation opens doors into areas for further 
consideration.  He takes seriously the interplay of similarity and difference, and of all of the 
writers we have considered thus far, he explores most deeply the implications that a comparative 
study of avatara and incarnation could have for theology and faith in either tradition. 
 
2.5  Julius Lipner 
 In his essay entitled “Avatara and Incarnation?”71 Julius Lipner moves in a direction 
similar to that of Noel Sheth.  The similarity lies in Lipner’s interest in not simply examining two 
ideas that appear similar, but also in considering how these ideas might mutually affect each 
other and the people to whom these ideas are significant.  More particularly, he poses the 
question of whether the terms avatara and incarnation can be used interchangeably. 
 The essay begins with a consideration of similarity and difference, a theme which is 
important for Lipner’s argument.  On the one hand, he is not interested in working with a 
“container theory”72 of language, in which context is given no regard and words are simply seen 
as containers of meaning.  To see the matter in this light, one could simply see avatara and 
                                                            
68 Cf. above, pp. 10-11, nn. 8, 9, 10. 
69 Sheth, 109:  “It is this…that is uniquely Christian.” 
70 Ibid., 115. 
71 Cf. above, p.15 , n. 35. 
72 On pp. 127-128, Lipner cites Nicholas Lash, Believing Three Ways in One God: A 
Reading of the Apostles’ Creed (University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), p. 11, against the 
container theory of language. 
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incarnation as two words that could be set side by side, corresponding to each other and likely 
meaning the same thing.  On the other hand, he is not comfortable with the kind of “over-
contextualizing”73 that will disallow any meaningful comparison on the grounds that the contexts 
that give rise to ideas and concepts are so unique that comparison is impossible.  Instead, Lipner 
works with the understanding that “difference is the other face of similarity,”74 and “difference” 
is that which can clarify meaning, deepen understanding, shed light on questions of identity, and 
encourage creative reflection on one’s own tradition. 
 Lipner identifies two major similarities for consideration:  Similarity of priority (the 
incarnation in Christianity and the avatara in Vaishnava Hinduism have a similar priority, hence 
the validity of the comparison)75 and similarity of benevolent intent (in both cases, the 
appearance of God comes about as a result of God’s benevolent intentions).76   The major 
differences which Lipner identifies are by now familiar:   avataras are multiple while the 
incarnation takes place only once;77 the two doctrines arise from different worldviews; the 
purposes of each type of divine descent or appearance are different. 
 These oft-cited differences, however, begin to appear more nuanced in Lipner’s view.  
Initially it appears as though the most significant difference between the two doctrines lies in the 
fact that for Christianity the purpose of the incarnation – in a particular time and place – is that of 
universal redemption, while in Vaishnavism it is generally understood that each avatar comes – 
to a particular time and place – for a particular purpose.78  However, simply to apply the terms 
                                                            
73 Lipner, 128.  Lipner also cites Peter Donovan, “The Intolerance of Religious 
Pluralism,” in Religious Studies 29, no. 2 (June 1993): p. 224, as an example of the criticism of 
overcontextualizing.  Although Lipner does not give further specific examples of ‘over-
contextualizers,’ he suggests, with Donovan, that post-modernism has so thoroughly stressed 
“the unique” that it allows for no legitimate comparison.  This focus on uniqueness has had the 
unexpected effect of allowing conservatism to break free from critical thought or critical self-
examination.  
74 Ibid., 129. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 132. 
77 Lipner does consider Aquinas’ argument (cf. p. 14, n. 30), but concludes that “it is true 
to say…that it is a doctrine for Christianity (Thomas Aquinas included) that in fact God 
incarnated only once in Jesus.” (131). 
78 See Ibid., 133 ff.  For instance, the matsya  or fish avatara, widely regarded as the first 
of the avataras of Vishnu, comes to rescue Manu from the floodwaters. 
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“universal” and “particular” to the respective doctrines of Christianity and Hinduism becomes 
problematic.   
 Lipner sees, in the repeated appearance of the avatara and in the Hindu notion of a 
universe pervaded by the presence of God, a heightened emphasis on divine care and 
compassion.  This repeated appearance  
highlights on the one hand the divine concern for the whole of creation by attention to a 
wide range of objectives and individuals. . . . Through the divine diffusiveness that that 
avatara-concept represents, the whole of creation, encompassing different times and 
spaces, is sacralised by the assumption of its various parts in God.79 
 
Hence in the particularity of the appearance of the avatar, Lipner sees a strong expression of 
universality.  Conversely, the universal implications of the Christian notion of incarnation, 
coupled with a language of faith that articulates the transcendence of God very well, comes to be 
seen as rather particularistic.  The language of transcendence and the uniqueness of the 
incarnation distance humans from God and from the non-human world, a distance which “has 
found expression in a range of sombre ecological and other consequences.”80     
 The other oft-cited difference, that between the cyclic worldview of Hinduism and the 
linear view of Christianity, also becomes more nuanced in light of the doctrines of avatara and 
incarnation.  The focus on the historical contingency of the avatara and (in some traditions) on 
the uniqueness of each avatara to a certain era gives to the avatara a heightened sense of 
contingency, opening the way to an understanding of history that is not simply cyclical, 
repetitive and fatalistic, but which allows for notions of progress within history.81  Christianity, 
on the other hand, does not simply function with a linear worldview, for the incarnation takes 
place “within the sequence of events in the world rather than at the chronological beginning or 
end,”82 and the event of the incarnation is understood to affect and “take up” the whole of history 
                                                            
79 Ibid., 135. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 137. 
82 Ibid..  Although Lipner does not address this in his essay, it is noteworthy that linearity 
can also pose problems for Christian thinking, if ‘linear’ implies the existence of past, present, 
and future.  Hans Schwarz notes that Christian thought distinguishes between the ‘everlasting,’ 
in which time continues to move forward, and the ‘eternal,’ in which there is no distinction 
between past, present, and future:  “In God . . . all the different times coincide.”  (Hans Schwarz, 
“Eschatology,” in Christian Dogmatics, Volume 2, edited by Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. 
Jenson, 471-587 (Philadelphia:  Fortress Press, 1984), 570.).  
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– the beginning and the end.  In both cases, the God who descends does so into a particular flow 
of events. 
 The real difference, according to Lipner, is on the level of contingency.  The avatara 
appears according to the needs of a time and a place, while the coming of the incarnate God of 
Christianity is not dependent on particular circumstances or efficacious only for those in that 
particular place or era. 
 At this point, Lipner begins to take up the question of the compatibility of the notions of 
avatara and incarnation.  He insists that the terms cannot simply be interchanged, for the unique 
“emotional and theological freight” carried by each term would render such a move 
“linguistically inadmissible and religiously highly dubious.”83  For Christians within and outside 
of India, however, the two terms can exist side-by-side, particularly if the term avatara is 
understood for Christians more along the lines of theophany and manifestation.  Thus, for 
Lipner, it would be quite admissible for Christians to maintain their view of the uniqueness of 
the incarnation in Jesus, while at the same time expanding their understanding of the appearance 
of God in the world by making use of the term avatara “to refer to divine theophanies in other 
subjects, both human and non-human.”84  The use of the term avatara could well enrich 
Christianity without detracting from its central claims about the incarnation.  The question 
Lipner leaves open, though, is whether a similar use of “incarnation” – with all of its issues of 
uniqueness and non-repeatability – could be considered acceptable by Hindus.85 
 
2.6  Regunta Yesurathnam 
 Regunta Yesurathnam86 approaches the topic in a manner similar to that of Lipner.  
While Lipner sets out to consider whether the terms avatara and incarnation can be used 
interchangeably, Yesurathnam’s article focuses on the question from the perspective of Indian 
Christianity and its ability to communicate the meaning of the doctrine of incarnation within the 
                                                            
83 Ibid., 139. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., 140. 
86 Regunta Yesurathnam,  “The Adequacy of the Concept of Avatara for Expounding the 
Christian Doctrine of Incarnation.”  Dialogue and Alliance 1, no. 2  (Summer 1987):  43-52. 
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Indian context.  Beyond simply considering the adequacy of the avatara doctrine for explaining 
incarnation, the question is put more directly near the end of the article: “Is Jesus an avatar?”87 
 The response to this question is worked out against the backdrop of a brief history of the 
idea of incarnation.  Yesurathnam entertains the idea that incarnation has its roots in Egypt, and 
he touches briefly on the existence of hints of incarnation throughout the ancient world:  In the 
cult of the Emperor in the Roman Empire, in divine mythical saviours such as Isis and Adonis, in 
the Tibetan Llamas, in early Parsi and Semitic ideas and in the Indian notion of bhakti (“the most 
wonderful conception of the divine outside biblical revelation”).88  All of this points to a 
widespread human longing to worship a tangible god, and it “proves that the idea of incarnation 
is not confined to any particular religion, nation, or people. . . . Whatever its origin, the idea of 
incarnation has become a universal idea.”89 
 Such a view of the apparent universal scope of the notion of incarnation is not all there 
is to the picture.  In all of these instances of what might loosely be called incarnation, there is a 
tendency to ascribe divinity to a powerful or heroic human figure, but something else appears as 
early as 3500 B.C.E. in India:  the idea that the divine also moves downward, into the realm of 
human affairs.90  This is what makes the question of avatara and incarnation so compelling for 
Yesurathnam, for both doctrines have at their centre the idea of God “coming down” into the 
human world.  It is this coming down that makes the two so similar to each other yet distinct 
from the vast array of understandings of incarnation and incarnate figures already seen in the 
historical sketch he presents earlier. 
 In addressing the question of the adequacy of avatara for explaining incarnation in 
Christianity, Yesurathnam turns to Indian Christian theologians and suggests an interesting 
distinction in their approaches that will lead them to give different responses to the question of 
Jesus as an avatar.  On the one side, Christian thinkers who align themselves with a monistic or 
advaitan perspective will have difficulty with the use of the term avatar to identify Jesus.  In the 
advaitan tradition, the avatara is seen as a form of maya, a kind of illusory expression of 
ultimate reality.  The avatar, as such an expression, comes into the human world to convince 
people of their unity with the one ultimate reality, Brahman.  Christians identifying with such a 
                                                            
87 Ibid., 49. 
88 Ibid., 44. 
89 Ibid., 45. 
90 Ibid., 44. 
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worldview91 could not, according to Yesurathnam, adopt the use of the term avatara for Jesus, 
for Jesus is believed to be a full incarnation of God whose purpose is something other than 
convincing humans of their identity with the Ultimate.92   
 The matter will appear differently from the perspective of those who identify more 
closely with the theistic perspectives of Indian thinkers such as Ramanuja and the visistadvaita 
school of Vedanta which he represents.  In this tradition, God, the world, and humanity are real; 
the avatara is also quite real, and devotion to God through the avatara is a means to salvation.  
The avatara reveals, in fact is a revelation of, the presence and the grace of God to the devotee, 
who in turn expresses loving devotion to this personal God.  Yesurathnam cites several examples 
of Indian Christian theologians93 who identify with this position and have little trouble using the 
term avatara – although with some reservations – for Jesus, who is also seen to be a gracious 
personal incarnation of a personal God, whose will it is to save the devotee.94 
 In answer to his own question, Yesurathnam does not seem willing to say simply that 
Jesus is an avatar.  The term itself carries much meaning that does not necessarily apply to the 
Christian doctrine of incarnation, but it is perhaps the best term available at the current time if 
one wishes to express with a single term what the Christian notion of incarnation means to an 
Indian audience.95  At this point, Yesurathnam puts forward two conclusions:  First, that the use 
of multiple terms from the one tradition might be necessary to explain the corresponding term in 
the other tradition.  Such interchanging of terms has to “do full justice to both the Christian and 
Hindu traditions.”96  This is a strong point of Yesurathnam’s article – while he speaks in terms of 
the ability of Christians to communicate in an Indian context, his concern for the integrity of 
both traditions suggests an interest in dialogue and understanding rather than simply conversion.  
The second conclusion, citing the work of Robin Boyd, is that the term avatara can add 
something to Christology, moving it away from the static to the dynamic:  “It takes Christology 
away from the categories of substance and person (hypostasis) – out of the realm of being into 
                                                            
91 Brahmabandav and Swami Abhishiktananda are cited by Yesurathnam as examples.  
Ibid., 50. 
92 Yesurathnam, 49 ff. 
93 Such as Bishop Appasamy, Chakkarai, and Sadhu Sunder Singh.  Ibid., 50. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., 51. 
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the realm of action.”97  Yesurathnam sees this as a favourable thing, and while Christian 
theologians might argue about whether the doctrine of incarnation is necessarily static without 
the perspective that something like avatara doctrine adds, his conclusion does suggest a dynamic 
way of considering the topic of avatara and incarnation; for the avatara doctrine is seen as 
somehow acting upon the Christian doctrine of incarnation.  In other words, as is the case with 
thinkers such as Sheth and Lipner, each perspective is seen as potentially being enriched by the 
other.  And as is particularly the case with Sheth, Yesurathnam sees the interplay of the two 
doctrines moving in the direction of the dynamic rather than the static. 
 
2.7  Conclusion 
 Each of the works considered in this chapter approaches the topic of avatara and 
incarnation from a comparative perspective, holding the two up to scrutiny, seeking differences 
and similarities, and where applicable, evaluating the two doctrines and systems of thought in 
which they live and breathe.  Several of the writers have attempted to approach the topic from an 
‘unbiased’ perspective, avoiding evaluative moves and seeking to understand each on its own 
terms.  Some have succeeded to a certain degree, while others have clearly tipped their hand in 
favour of, in each case, the Christian understanding of incarnation over against the Hindu idea of 
the avatara, and thus, revealing their own biases.  Three of the writers under consideration – 
Sheth, Lipner, and Yesurathnam – have approached the matter with a view toward answering the 
question, “How might the one doctrine affect the other?”  How might the Christian notion of 
incarnation be affected by a serious consideration of the Hindu belief in the avatar, and vice-
versa?   
 In doing so, these last three have also taken the discussion further in the direction of a 
consideration of the doctrines of avatara and incarnation in the context of the lives of devotees 
and believers.  In the chapters that will follow, rather than simply holding up the notions of 
avatara and incarnation and then comparing them (apart from a context),98 and rather than 
seeking to stand at a distance and take the doctrines apart, the focus will turn to a deeper 
examination of each of the notions of avatar and incarnation from the perspective of particular 
                                                            
97 Robin Boyd, Kristadvaita (Madras:  Christian Literature Society, 1977), 148.  Cited in 
Yesurathnam, 51. 
98 Cf. Lipner, 128. 
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devotees and believers within each tradition.  It is proposed that this approach will give further 
insight into questions of ethics and belief, and will lead to a deeper understanding, not of the 
ways in which doctrines themselves are similar or different, but in the ways in which doctrines, 
with their similarities and difference, take shape in or in fact shape the lives of persons of faith. 
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3.  DIETRICH BONHOEFFER: 
THE PARTICULARITY OF INCARNATION 
 
 
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) was a German Lutheran pastor and theologian who 
has come to be recognized as one of the most significant figures in Protestant theology in the 
first half of the twentieth century.  Terms coined in Bonhoeffer’s works are widely used in 
Christian circles, even by those unfamiliar with his works.  Beyond the circles of the church, 
Bonhoeffer is known for his political activities in opposition to the Nazi regime, activities which 
led to his imprisonment and, eventually, his execution. 
  Bonhoeffer’s political activities were deeply rooted in his Lutheran Christianity, and 
even his opposition to the Nazi regime had its roots not so much in political theory or humanist 
ideals, but in an understanding of the proper relationship between church and state and of the 
ways in which the two should function in society.  Even in the context of his most secular 
thought, Bonhoeffer saw himself above all as a pastor and a theologian of the church, and as 
such, as a servant and follower of Christ. 
 The work of Bonhoeffer the theologian will be considered, paying particular attention to 
his thinking about incarnation as this thought takes shape in three different works:  Lectures on 
Christology, Discipleship, and Letters and Papers from Prison.1  From the start, it will be seen 
that the decisive matter for Bonhoeffer is to reckon not with incarnation as a doctrine but with 
the person who is said to be the incarnate one:  Jesus Christ.  This reckoning with the person will 
also be seen to draw Bonhoeffer more deeply into an active engagement with the world. 
 
3.1  Lectures on Christology 2 
   Central to Bonhoeffer’s Lectures on Christology is the question, “Who are you?”  Who 
are you, this incarnate one?  Who are you, Jesus Christ?3  The question appears repeatedly 
                                                            
1 Reference to further works, when appropriate, will be through secondary sources. 
2 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Lectures on Christology.  Translated by Edwin Robertson 
(London: Collins and Sons; New York:  Harper and Row, 1966, 1978).  It should be noted that 
the lectures on Christology as we have received them are not Bonhoeffer’s own words, but are 
the result of the work of his former student, close friend, and colleague Eberhard Bethge, who 
compiled the text based on the notes of students who attended Bonhoeffer’s  lectures at the 
University of Berlin in 1933. 
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throughout the work, and will be seen to be the question that continues to focus Bonhoeffer’s 
thought throughout his career. 
 This approach to Christology rules out questions about how the incarnation takes place, 
how it is that God and humanity could come together in one person, or how it is that one might 
understand the idea of two natures and one person.  The possibility of explaining the incarnation 
is put aside altogether, as is speculation about a pre-existent “human nature” coming together 
with a pre-existent “divine nature” to make this unique person, Jesus Christ.4  In Bonhoeffer’s 
understanding, the person Jesus Christ is always the starting point for theology and Christology.  
So rather than needing to be explained, Christ is simply the given upon which all thought is 
based:  “God in timeless eternity is not God; Jesus limited by time is not Jesus.  Rather we may 
say that in the man Jesus, God is God.  In this Jesus Christ, God is present.  The one God-Man is 
the starting point for Christology.”5  The point is pushed even further – beyond Christology – 
toward the end of the work when the claim is made that “nothing can be known either of God or 
man6 until God has become man in Jesus Christ.”7  The how of speculation gives way to the who 
of faith, a question that is addressed to one who is already presumed to exist; for Bonhoeffer, 
then, the discussion will always steer away from talk of incarnation as a doctrine to talk of the 
incarnate one, the person.8 
 Bonhoeffer does not understand this approach to be anything new in Christology or 
theology.  He returns to the Chalcedonian definition of 451 C.E. to support this notion of the 
importance of the “who” question.  The Chalcedonian definition states simply that in the person 
Jesus Christ, the same Christ is to be acknowledged in two natures – divine and human – without 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 Ibid., 34. 
4 Ibid., 101. 
5 Ibid., 45. 
6 Although inclusive language is preferable, noting or changing every use of the word 
“man” in the translations of Bonhoeffer’s work that are available would make for a cumbersome 
and repetitive use of parentheses or notations of sic.  In direct quotations, the original 
terminology will be retained.   
7 Ibid., 101.  Clifford Green sees this line of thought developing in Bonhoeffer’s later 
works, such as Ethics, in which Green understands Bonhoeffer to be saying that  “God became 
human in order that we might become human.  The incarnation is about the humanization of the 
human race, not its divinization.”  (Clifford Green, “Human Sociality and Christian 
Community,” The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, edited by John W. de Gruchy, 
113-132 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), 121.) 
8 Lectures on Christology, 104. 
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confusion of and change in the natures, but also without separation and without division.9  The 
definition itself spells out that what can be said about Christ is only what cannot be said of Christ 
(there is neither confusion nor separation of the divine and human natures).  For Bonhoeffer, the 
definition once more rules out speculative inquiry about the “how” of the incarnation, or 
“objective talk” about pre-existing deity or humanity.  Although the Chalcedonian definition has 
been accused of being at the root of a dry Scholasticism, Bonhoeffer disagrees with this 
accusation,10 insisting that the definition points to a living person as the proper starting point for 
Christology, that of the person of Jesus Christ as revealed in Scripture.11  Here again, Bonhoeffer 
is insisting that the question of Christology is not “how” – how do the natures come together, 
how can they be neither confused nor separated, what is the nature of the natures “before” the 
incarnation, and so on – but “who” – “Who are you?”  The Chalcedonian definition eliminates 
the objectifying “how” questions and leaves only the one question:  “‘Who are you?’  The 
Chalcedonian definition is itself ultimately the question, ‘Who?’”12 
 Similarly, Bonhoeffer is reluctant to ask the question of why the incarnation takes place.  
Little if any attention is given to such a question.  If the incarnation is the only starting point for 
Christology, then to search for a purpose that gives rise to the incarnation, or to devise a divine 
scheme of justice that needs to be satisfied, is to make the incarnation a secondary matter.  If the 
incarnation is the result of some sort of logical necessity, then that logical necessity becomes the 
decisive matter.  To speculate that the incarnation had to happen in order for such and such to 
happen is the same as to speculate on the objective nature of the divine or the human before the 
                                                            
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 88. 
11 Throughout this section of the Lectures on Christology Bonhoeffer speaks in terms of 
“the facts” and “the given facts,” by which he refers to the Biblical witness to Christ.  This 
emphasis on Christ as revealed in Scripture is not a call for biblical literalism or a kind of “Bible 
believing” Christianity as it is commonly understood.  Rather, Bonhoeffer is distinguishing 
between reflection that begins with Christ and speculation that begins with metaphysics.  He 
insists that the starting point for theological reflection is the person of Christ as revealed in 
Scripture, rather than speculation about pre-existing divine nature and human nature that 
somehow come together in Christ, who is then revealed in Scripture.   
12 Ibid., 102.  The translator of this edition speaks in the preface of the Chalcedonian 
definition in Bonhoeffer’s eyes as “cold, statue cold, [requiring] the warm breath of life before it 
can be recognized as anything to do with Jesus Christ.” (21).  The translator himself seems to 
have overlooked Bonhoeffer’s comment linking the Definition with the “who” question, a link 
which for Bonhoeffer turns the discussion away from cold speculation.  
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incarnation.  To ask the question of why or even to speak of the purpose of the incarnation would 
be to make the incarnate one beholden to that purpose or to a particular theological scheme. 
 It is more accurate to state that Bonhoeffer speaks of the results of the incarnation or of 
the meaning of the incarnation:  If we begin with the incarnate one, what does that say about 
God?  About humanity?  About the world?   Bonhoeffer will say, then, that the incarnation 
unveils the image of God,13 and that it makes faith possible.14  At the same time, it is always 
understood to be an act of divine freedom:  “A speculative basis for the doctrine of the 
incarnation in an idea of God would change the free relationship between Creator and creature 
into a logical necessity.  The incarnation is contingent.  God binds himself freely to the creature 
and freely glorifies himself in the incarnate one.”15  Rather than beginning with a predetermined 
purpose which the incarnation then fulfills, Bonhoeffer begins with the person – God freely 
becoming incarnate – and proceeds from there. 
 For Bonhoeffer, the question “Who are you?” assures that Christology will always be 
dealing with an actual person rather than with an abstraction or a set of ideas, or even with 
eternal or timeless truth.  For if Christology is somehow concerned with truth, this truth is never 
understood to be a “thing” which is available for one to use at one’s convenience, nor is it 
“eternal truth,” a set of principles and ideas that are never changing.  Instead, truth is seen to be 
tied to the person of Jesus Christ, whom Bonhoeffer always understands to be present in the 
living encounter.  Of this incarnate one, the question of how or why will not do:  “Only the 
question “Who are you” will do.”16     
 
3.1.1  Christ pro me 
 This incarnate one is always understood by Bonhoeffer to be the one who is present pro 
me – “for me.”17  Bonhoeffer’s intent in using the term pro me is to underline two things:  First, 
that Christ is always to be spoken of as a person – not a principle or an idea or an influence or a 
personality18 – who is present in the world, most notably in the Word, the Sacrament, and the 
                                                            
13 Ibid., 105. 
14 Ibid., 110. 
15 Ibid., 106. 
16 Ibid., 30. 
17 Ibid., 43-55. 
18 Ibid., 44.   
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Church;19 second, that the incarnate one is always properly spoken of in relation to and in the 
context of human history, real events, and real people – Christ is present for all of these.   
Although the use of pro me suggests an individualistic approach which sees Christ 
primarily in terms of the relationship to the individual, it is important to note that Bonhoeffer 
also uses the term pro nobis – for us – at other points in Lectures on Christology:  “The 
humiliated one is the form of Christ pro nobis. . . . In this form he purposes and wills us to be in 
freedom.”20  It is noteworthy that these lectures were delivered in 1933, the year in which Hitler 
became chancellor of Germany.  His inclusion of the term pro nobis in the context of freedom 
suggests that Bonhoeffer already clearly sees the social threat posed by Hitler, and the social 
implications of the incarnate one for those who live under that threat.  Ernst Feil draws attention 
to this as a significant shift for Bonhoeffer: 
What is significant here is that Bonhoeffer quietly changed the pro me into pro nobis, 
“for us” . . . , thereby laying the groundwork for his Christological expression, “Christ – 
the one for others,” which emerged in his final letters.  The aspect of sociality comes to 
full expression only in that change; the vicarious nature of Jesus Christ is itself 
understood in social categories, for it is not only for me but also for us.21   
 
The use of pro me or pro nobis does not intend to draw attention to “me” or to “us;” it is one of 
Bonhoeffer’s ways of insisting that Christ always exists for the other.  There is no such thing as 
Christ “for himself,” Christ’s being and acting pro me or pro nobis are at the core of the being of 
the incarnate one – “the essence . . . the being of the person himself.”22  Christ is the one “for 
others,” and to think of him otherwise “is not only useless . . . it is even godless.”23  
 
 
                                                            
19 See below, pp. 42 ff. 
20 Ibid., 110. 
21 Ernst Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. by Martin Rumscheidt 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 75. 
22 Lectures on Christology, 47.  Again, cf. Green in reference to Bonhoeffer’s earlier 
work, Act and Being:  “God’s being is being-in-relation-to-us.  This is the meaning of the 
incarnation:  God with us, and God for us.”  (Human Sociality and Christian Community, 114.).  
This understanding of the incarnation is clearly a social understanding, which will be developed 
more fully.  Green claims that already in Bonhoeffer’s earliest work, Communio Sanctorum, 
creation, sin, and revelation “can only be understood in terms of sociality” (113).  As 
Bonhoeffer’s work on Christology develops, it will become clear that the same could be said of 
his understanding of incarnation.   
23 Ibid., 47. 
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3.1.2  Christ the Centre 
 Another way of speaking that characterizes Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Christ is of 
Christ as the centre.24  As Bonhoeffer focuses on Christ as the one for others, he speaks of Christ 
being at the centre in three different ways:  Christ as the centre of human existence, Christ as the 
centre of history, and Christ as the centre between God and nature.25  In this case Christ as 
“centre” does not only refer to a centre around which all else revolves, but particularly to a centre 
that stands between, at the boundary between the old existence and a new existence.  Bonhoeffer 
describes this as a paradox, for “in the fallen world the centre is also the boundary.”26   
In terms of Christ the centre of human existence, Christ is understood by Bonhoeffer to 
be the boundary between the old self and the new self, “between ‘I’ and ‘I.’”27  Humanity has 
failed to fulfill the law of God, and in so doing has failed to be truly human, to be all that God 
intended humanity to be.  In this sense humanity stands judged by Christ who is fully human, 
who keeps the law.  Christ stands in humanity’s place and fulfills this law, doing for humanity 
what it could not do itself and thus making humanity fully human.  Christ as the centre of human 
existence thus judges and justifies humanity.  
In a similar way, Bonhoeffer understands Christ to be the centre of history:  history is full 
of promise, but this promise always falls short and history itself is seen to be under the same 
judgement as humanity.  Christ as centre exposes the false Messianic claims of the state and of 
all those who would redeem history, and is himself understood to be the Messiah – the hidden 
Messiah28 – who fulfills that promise:  “The Messiah, Christ, is at one and the same time the 
destroyer and the fulfiller of all the messianic expectations of history.”29  Christ both judges and 
justifies history, as he does humanity.   
                                                            
24 The first English edition of Lectures on Christology was in fact titled Christ the Center.  
(Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christ the Center, introduced by Edwin H. Robertson and translated by 
John Bowden (New York:  Harper and Row, 1966).) 
25 Christology, Ibid., 60ff. 
26 Ibid., 61. 
27 Ibid., 60. 
28 Ibid., 62 ff. 
29 Ibid., 62. It is noteworthy that Bonhoeffer also sees the Church, as the presence of 
Christ in the world, as being at the centre of the State – Christ the centre of history is present (yet 
hidden) as the Church at the centre of the state (63 ff).  Bonhoeffer claims that the church does 
not need to be recognized as such by the state (as it clearly was not by the National Socialist 
government), and it could be argued that one of Bonhoeffer’s theological difficulties with the 
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In a different way, Bonhoeffer understands Christ to be the centre between God and 
nature.  Unlike humanity and history, nature does not stand under judgement, but is bound by the 
sin of humanity and history.  A sign of Christ between God and nature is seen in the sacraments, 
when the elements of nature in bondage become part of the new and free creation.30  Bonhoeffer 
sees nature in bondage as unable to speak, whereas nature redeemed freely proclaims the word of 
God, with no human explanation needed.31  Christ as the centre, then, is understood by 
Bonhoeffer to set nature free to praise God.32 
Christ being at the centre simply means that Bonhoeffer sees Christ as the one through 
whom all promise is fulfilled – promise for humanity, for history, and for nature.  At this point it 
becomes possible to speak more clearly of the purpose of the incarnation without at the same 
time tying the incarnation to some kind of logical necessity or pre-existent set of conditions that 
necessitate incarnation.  The state of humanity, history, and nature are simply givens, and the 
incarnate one stands at the boundary, moving all that is from judgement to justification, from 
bondage to freedom.  This is the purpose of the incarnation, then – to move the world from 
bondage to freedom.33  Christ as the centre means that Christ pro me is the true human, the 
fulfiller of the law, the liberator of creation, the one at the centre or the boundary between the old 
“fallen” world and the “new world of God.”34   
 
3.1.3  Christ Humiliated 
 Bonhoeffer asserts that Jesus Christ is “God who became man, just as we became man.  
He lacks nothing belonging to man.”35  The most important point for Bonhoeffer, though, is not 
simply that God became human.  The incarnation as such is not the decisive issue.  What matters 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Nazi government was that it inverted this relationship, and saw the State as being at the centre of 
the Church 
30 Ibid., 64-65. 
31 Ibid., 65. 
32 See below, p. 78, n. 2. 
33 This will come up later on in Discipleship when Bonhoeffer discusses the church’s 
dying and rising with Christ – a movement from old life to new life, from bondage to freedom.  
Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer,  Discipleship.  Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works Vol. 4.  Edited by Geffrey B. 
Kelly and John D. Godsey.  Translated by Barbara Green and Reinhard Krauss  (Minneapolis:  
Fortress Press, 2003), pp. 214 ff.   
34 Ibid., 65.  See below, pp. 40ff., for further discussion of Christ as ‘mediator.’ 
35 Ibid., 102-103.   
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the most is that this incarnate one is also the humiliated one.  If Christ poses difficulty for human 
reason, this difficulty is not that divine and human nature come together in the one person Jesus 
Christ.  The difficulty for human understanding is that this incarnate one – the divine-human – 
should become humiliated, should take on the “likeness of sinful flesh.”36  As with the question 
of the divine and human natures, Bonhoeffer does not attempt to explain this in terms that would 
answer the question of “how.”  The given is simply that the incarnate one takes the form of sinful 
flesh.  As has already been seen, the most important thing for Bonhoeffer is that Jesus Christ is 
“God for us.”37  “God for us” is the incarnate one, and the scandal of this incarnate one is that 
“this incarnate one is also the crucified,”38 or, to use the kind of language that Bonhoeffer 
favours, the incarnate one is also the humiliated one.  While the church might claim to know the 
exalted Christ – risen from the dead and ascended into heaven – this exalted one is always also 
the humiliated one.   
 This becomes the most important matter for Bonhoeffer’s Lectures on Christology, and 
any positive claims about Christ are made in the light of the humiliation.  So Christ is present as 
the Word39 – as the living Word of God, a living address to humanity; and as the humiliated 
word, in the weakness and fallibility of preaching, of human words.  Christ is present as 
Sacrament, risen and present but also hidden in water, wine, and bread, the elements of nature in 
bondage.  Christ is present as Church, which is understood by Bonhoeffer to be the embodied 
presence of Christ on earth, but which is also clearly weak, “sinful flesh.”  In all cases, Christ as 
Word, Sacrament, and Church is exalted and humiliated.  Whatever might be said about the 
exalted Christ, God incarnate, it must also always be said that this same one is the humiliated 
                                                            
36 Ibid., 46. 
37 Ibid., 103.  Cf. Green as well, who points out that Bonhoeffer, in Creation and Fall, 
reworks the understanding of “image of God” to be a reference not to a particular human or 
divine quality, but rather to God’s relatedness to the world and hence humanity’s relatedness to 
one another:  “In contrast to all individualistic interpretations of the image of God, Bonhoeffer 
insists that this image or likeness must be understood as a particular relationship between 
persons. . . . Being-free-for-the-other-in-love images God’s loving freedom for humanity. . . . 
Since God’s being is being-for-humanity, so human relationships image this in one person 
‘being-free-for-the-other’ in love.”  (116 -117).  Here we see theology and anthropology both 
beginning with the incarnation;  Christ, the incarnate one, is free for the other; God’s being is to 
be free for the other; to be human is be free for the other.   
38 Ibid., 106. 
39 For a more detailed discussion of Christ present as Word, Sacrament, and Church, see 
Ibid., 49-59. 
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one, who took on sinful flesh, scandalized the righteous and upright, offended the pure, suffered 
and died: 
In the humiliation, Christ, of his own free will, enters the world of sin and death.  He 
enters it in such a way as to hide himself in it in weakness and not to be recognized as 
God-Man.  He does not enter in kingly robes of a . . . ‘form of God’. . . . His claim, 
which he as God-Man raises in this form, must provoke contradiction and hostility.  He 
goes incognito, as a beggar among beggars, as an outcast among outcasts, as despairing 
among the despairing, as dying among the dying.  He also goes as sinner among sinners, 
yet how truly as . . . ‘the worst sinner’ . . . as sinless among sinners.40  
 
For Bonhoeffer, this raises a central problem of Christology: “Has Jesus as the humiliated God-
Man entered fully into human sin?”41  He echoes the Chalcedonian Definition in terms that 
preserve the unity and the distinctness of the sinful and the sinless, such that the paradox is 
always maintained:   
He is wholly in the homoioma sarkos [likeness of sinful flesh] and condemned as we 
are, and he yet is without sin.  The homoioma sarkos is also fastened upon him with its 
realm of sin, but it is fastened upon him, who yet is without sin.  Without trying to 
balance, we have to say, it is he, not the homoioma sarkos, who is without sin – but he 
will not be separated from this homoioma sarkos.  Christology cannot by-pass this 
paradox.42 
 
 The Lectures on Christology, with their clear emphasis on the centrality of Christ – not 
only for Christians and for the church, but for humanity, history, and nature – might be seen as 
an unfolding of an exclusivist approach, for all clearly hinges on Christ and on no other.  It is 
essential to remember, though, that for Bonhoeffer Christ is always the one who exists “for 
others”43 and who became incarnate in the context of weakness and humiliation.  He is therefore 
                                                            
40 Ibid., 107 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 109 
43 For a further working out of this idea in relation to Latin American Liberation theology 
and, to a lesser extent, the thought of Gandhi, see Glyn Richards, “Faith and Praxis in Liberation 
Theology, Bonhoeffer, and Gandhi.”  Modern Theology 3, (July 1987), 359-373.   
Counter to the suggestion that his thought is exclusivist, it is also noteworthy that 
Bonhoeffer had once planned to travel to India to visit Gandhi, stating in correspondence with a 
friend that “there must be other people in the world who know and who can do more than we.  
And in that case it is simply philistine not to go and learn from them.”  (Feil, 197)  For more on 
Bonhoeffer and Gandhi see below, 80ff. 
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never to be seen in terms of superiority, exclusivity, and power.  As Bonhoeffer concludes this 
section of the lectures,44 he applies the same kind of language to the church:   
All that (the glorification of God) we know today only through the encounter with the 
humiliated one.  It is with this humiliated one that the Church goes its own way of 
humiliation. . . . The church also can be exalted or lowly, so long as in both cases it is 
the way of Christ with it.  This way is the enemy of pride, whether it is wrapped in the 
purple robe or the crown of martyrdom is set upon it.  The Church gazes always only at 
the humiliated Christ, whether it itself is exalted or made low.45 
 
Whatever the situation of the church, Bonhoeffer uses language that will not make allowances 
for power and triumph in the image of the church and its people. 
 
3.2  Discipleship46 
 The Lectures on Christology emphasize the person of Christ being at the centre of all 
theological thought and of the life of the church.  As the work progresses, Bonhoeffer begins to 
focus on the church and its sharing in the suffering of this one who is at its centre.  Discipleship 
continues this line of thinking, paying close attention to the Christological themes developed in 
the earlier work and paying increased attention to the working out of these themes in the life of 
the church.  As Discipleship draws to a close, Bonhoeffer’s thinking continues to move outward, 
insisting that the church which bears the name of the incarnate one is rightly understood to exist 
for the world and in the world.  
 
3.2.1  Christ as Mediator 
 As Bonhoeffer developed the idea of Christ as the centre in Lectures on Christology, he 
began to speak of Christ as mediator, and he worked out this idea more fully in Discipleship.  
The theme is certainly familiar to Christian thought, with Christ often spoken of as the mediator 
between God and humanity.  This way of understanding Christ as mediator is part of 
                                                            
44 The next and final part of Bonhoeffer’s lectures on Christology was entitled “The 
Eternal Christ.”  The translator’s note in this section simply says, “There is no trace of any notes 
on the third part of this lecture series.  It is thought that it was never completed.”  (Ibid., 117)  
45 Ibid., 113. 
46 This work is more commonly known as The Cost of Discipleship.  The most recent 
English translation, the critical edition included in the Fortress Press series “Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
Works,” is simply entitled Discipleship – a direct translation of the German title Nachfolge.  This 
title will be used throughout this paper, rather than the more familiar title of earlier editions.  
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Bonhoeffer’s understanding, but he sees Christ as mediator in a variety of other ways and, one 
might argue, in much more radical ways.  The claim he makes is that Christ, as the incarnate one, 
comes between the disciple and everything that one comes to think of as “natural” or “ordinary” 
life.  The disciple is tied only to Christ, is bound to Christ, and so has no more “immediate 
connections with the world.”47  The disciple has no immediate connection with God, with her-or-
himself, with the world, with history, with the neighbour, with ‘the way things are.’ 
 On the one hand, this suggests a certain separation from the world, 48 and Bonhoeffer 
writes with a sense of the isolation of the individual in the face of God and the world.49  The 
intention, however, is not to separate the Christian from the world but to change the way that the 
Christian understands him-or-herself in relation to the world:   
In becoming human, [Christ] put himself between me and the given circumstances of 
the world.  I cannot go back.  He is in the middle.  He has deprived those whom he has 
called of every immediate connection to those given realities.  He wants to be the 
medium; everything should happen only through him.50 
   
Following this line of thought, Clifford Green suggests that for Bonhoeffer Christ is also 
mediator in the same way that “beliefs, images, and stereotypes [are mediators of] our 
experience.”51  Christ, as the person for others who stands between the believer and the world, 
mediates experience and action in such a way that the disciples, for example, refrain from 
judging, resist imposing their own will on the neighbour, and act with deeds of love and mercy 
for the other.52  Christ as mediator shapes perception, and shapes human action as well. 
                                                            
47 Ibid., 93. 
48 In fact, Discipleship is sometimes seen to have sectarian and legalistic undertones, 
undertones which Bonhoeffer recognized later on (see Letters and Papers from Prison, enlarged 
ed., edited by Eberhard Bethge, trans. by Reginald Fuller, Frank Clark et al (New York:  Collier 
Books, 1972), 369).  Bonhoeffer did not, however, see these undertones as reason to distance 
himself from what he had written:  “Today I can see the dangers of that book, though I still stand 
by what I wrote.” 
49 See, for example, Geffrey B. Kelly and John D. Godsey, “Editors’ Introduction to the 
English Edition,” Discipleship, 10 ff.; Geffrey B. Kelly, “The Influence of Kierkegaard on 
Bonhoeffer’s Concept of Discipleship,” Irish Theological Quarterly 41, no. 2 (April 1974): 148-
54, for closer examinations of the influence of the thought of Kierkegaard on Bonhoeffer’s work 
at this time. 
50 Discipleship, 93. 
51 Green, “Human Sociality,” 126. 
52 See Discipleship, 169-175, for Bonhoeffer’s detailed comments on judging, imposition, 
and love. 
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 So on the one hand, Christ is seen to divide, to stand between the disciple and the world.  
Yet for Bonhoeffer the most important thing will be that the one who divides by standing 
between the disciple and the other is also the one who unites the disciple to the world in love, 
and whose suffering unites the community of disciples to the whole world in suffering.  As the 
community of disciples – the church – bears suffering, it is united through suffering with God, 
and it is united through suffering with all those around it who bear suffering.53 
 
3.2.2  Christ as Church  
 With Christ – the one for others – as the starting point of theology, and with Christ 
understood to be the mediator of all relations with others and with the world, it is not surprising 
that Bonhoeffer will understand theology and the life of the disciple to be social, to be concerned 
about relations with the world.  Likewise, just as Christ pro me broadens to become Christ pro 
nobis, so also Christology broadens to become social, to become ecclesiology.  Ernst Feil makes 
the observation that “Every feasible theology is christology (sic) for Bonhoeffer, and, since 
Christ is both man and humankind and exists not for himself or the individual but for all, every 
such theology is also ecclesiology.”54  From the beginning, then, theology is social in nature; 
theology is ecclesiology. 
In the Lectures on Christology Bonhoeffer had already begun to speak of Christ as being 
present not only in the church but also as the church.55  In Discipleship, the reality of the 
incarnation in/as the church is clearly connected to the reality of the incarnation in/as the 
physical body of Jesus Christ.  Bonhoeffer’s chapter on “The Visible Church Community” 
begins with the following statement:  “The body of Christ takes up physical space here on 
earth.”56  This statement moves in two directions.  On the one hand, it is a simple affirmation of 
Bonhoeffer’s belief in the reality that God is present in the world as the person Jesus Christ – the 
incarnation takes place in a real body, a physical body that takes up a particular space in a 
particular time.  Throughout Discipleship, though (even before the chapter on the visible 
community), it is clear that Bonhoeffer is also working with the idea of the church as the body of 
Christ, in which Christ becomes incarnate, taking up physical space in the world:   
                                                            
53 Ibid., 104. 
54 Feil, 67. 
55 Lectures on Christology, 58ff. 
56 Discipleship, 225. 
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Since the ascension, Jesus Christ’s place on earth has been taken by his body, the church 
[Kirche] (sic).57 The church is the present Christ himself. . . . While we are used to 
thinking of the church as an institution, we ought instead to think of it as a person with a 
body, although of course a person in a unique sense.58   
 
Here again, Bonhoeffer refuses to speak of incarnation, of Christ, or of the church in abstract 
form:   
A truth, a doctrine, or a religion needs no space of its own.  Such entities are bodyless.  
But the incarnate Son of God needs not only ears or even hearts; he needs actual, living 
human beings who follow him.  That is why he called his disciples into following him 
bodily.  His community with them was something everyone could see. . . . Here were 
bodies that acted, worked, and suffered in community with Jesus.   
The body of the exalted Lord is likewise a visible body, taking the form of the 
church-community.59  
 
If Christ is understood to be incarnate in the church, and if Christ is also understood to be 
“the one for others,” then the church, according to Bonhoeffer, must understand itself to be for 
the other, for the neighbour.  The editors of the English edition of Discipleship state 
Bonhoeffer’s position thus:  “The Christian life that emerges from the empowering presence of 
Jesus Christ in people’s lives is the life of Christ himself, always directed to being for others, 
being for God’s world.  In Christ one embraces both God and the world.”60  Note the 
incarnational move – the life of the Christian is the life of Christ – and note that that incarnation 
is understood to take shape in the life of the church directed in the same direction as the life of 
Christ – toward the other.  
 This position is significant for Bonhoeffer in that what had come to define the church of 
Germany in the 1930s was the same thing that had come to define the German state – the idea of 
                                                            
57 Just prior to this, Bonhoeffer makes an almost parallel statement:  “Since Pentecost 
Jesus Christ lives here on earth in the form of his body, the church-community.” (218)  In the 
critical edition of Discipleship, the German word Kirche is translated “church,” and the German 
Gemeinde is translated “church-community.”  In Discipleship, Bonhoeffer often appears to use 
the two terms interchangeably, with the following distinctions:  Gemeinde always refers to the 
visible church community, the community of disciples living in a particular time and place; 
Kirche may also be used refer to this visible community, but when Bonhoeffer refers either to the 
church in its broader sense – the whole communion of saints – or to the church as an unfaithful 
or divided institution, he uses only this term.   
58 Ibid., 218. 
59 Ibid., 226. 
60 Cf. Ibid., Geffrey B. Kelly and John D. Godsey ,“Editors’ Introduction to the English 
Edition,” 9.  
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nationhood and the idea of belonging reserved only for a particular people.  While the German 
church joined the state in defining who could or could not belong, Bonhoeffer stressed that the 
very idea of incarnation, and so the very life of the church, could only be understood in terms of 
its being for others rather than in terms of included insiders and the excluded other. The 
connection is very important for Bonhoeffer:  incarnation, love for the world, and the love of the 
church for the world all belong together.61    
 It is important to note that for Bonhoeffer this is not simply ethical exhortation.  If 
ethics for the disciple and the church were to mean the application of timeless ethical principles, 
then theology and the church would remove Christ from the centre and replace the incarnate God 
with those principles.62  For Bonhoeffer, one does not seek to be ethical in order to become more 
like Christ.  Rather, because the incarnation is always the starting point for theological reflection 
and for the self-understanding of the church, the community of disciples understands Christ to be 
incarnate in it already.  Rather than acting to become more like Christ, the church understands 
itself to be Christ’s body already, and so acts accordingly – being for others as Christ is for 
others.  The church does not seek to shape itself into the form of Christ.  Rather, Christ is 
understood to be incarnate in the church:  “It is the very image of God, the form of Christ, which 
seeks to take shape within us (Gal. 4:19). . . . Christ does not cease working in us until he has 
changed us into Christ’s own image.  Our goal is to be shaped into the entire form of the 
incarnate, the crucified, and the transfigured one.”63 
 Bonhoeffer clearly insists, though, that this incarnation of Christ in the church or even 
as the church does not amount to “a mystical fusion between church-community and Christ.”64  
There is not a simple identification of Christ with the church, for a distinction still needs to be 
                                                            
61 This incarnational/ethical theme is noted by other commentators on the thought of 
Bonhoeffer.  John D. Godsey points out what he sees to be an overarching theme in Bonhoeffer’s 
theology:  that the incarnation in the church not only calls the church to an ethic of love, but it 
makes this very ethic possible:  “God’s love for the world, incarnated in Jesus Christ, provides 
the foundation, norm and possibility for all Christian love.” (John D. Godsey, “Bonhoeffer’s 
Doctrine of Love,” In New Studies in Bonhoeffer’s Ethics.  Edited by William J. Peck, 189-234 
(Lewiston/Queenston:  The Edwin Mellen Press, 1987), 232.).  Again, Clifford Green speaks of 
incarnation, in Bonhoeffer’s understanding, as being the “paradigm for responsible vicarious 
action for others.” (Clifford Green, “Human Sociality,” 128.) 
62 Larry Rasmussen, “A Question of Method,” in New Studies in Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, ed. 
by William J. Peck, 103-138 (Lewiston/Queenston:  The Edwin Mellen Press, 1987), 108ff. 
63 Discipleship, 284-85. 
64 Ibid., 220. 
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maintained:  While Christ is in unity with the church, he is still “Lord of” the church, “the head 
of the body.”  So while the church can identify itself as the body of the crucified and risen Christ, 
the church still waits for Christ who is to come again.  In language that once again echoes the 
language of the Chalcedonian definition, Bonhoeffer puts it thus:   
The same Christ who is present in his church-community will return from heaven.  In 
both cases it is the same Lord and it is the same church; in both cases it is the very same 
body of the one who is present here and now, and the one who will return in the clouds.  
However, it makes a serious difference whether we are here or there.  Thus, both the 
unity and the distinction are necessary aspects of the same truth.65   
 
The church stands as one with the crucified and risen Christ, yet that same crucified and risen 
one is seen to stand over the church; the church still waits for that one to come. 
This is an important distinction, for it raises the question of how the church’s claim to 
identity with Christ might be evaluated.  Bonhoeffer’s view of incarnation in the church could 
easily be used to identify the church uncritically with Christ.  Yet Bonhoeffer himself did not 
simply accept the church’s claims for itself, and he was clearly not willing to identify the state 
church of Germany as the living Body of Christ in the world.  It is significant that Bonhoeffer 
places so much emphasis on being shaped into the form of the incarnate one who is also the 
crucified one.66  One cannot speak of the incarnate one without also speaking of the suffering of 
that one, and if that same Christ is understood to be incarnate in the community of the church, 
then the church needs to be willing to see itself as the suffering church:   
In the community of the crucified and transfigured body of Jesus Christ, we take part in 
Christ’s suffering and glory. Christ’s cross is laid upon the body of the church-
community.  All sufferings under this cross are Christ’s sufferings. . . . Such vicariously 
representative action and suffering, which is carried out by the members of the body of 
Christ, is itself the very life of Christ who seeks to take shape in his members67 
 
At this point Bonhoeffer distanced himself from the prevailing understanding within the German 
church that aligned it with a powerful and triumphant state.  As it is with Christ – being for 
others, loving the world, suffering – so it is for the church in which Christ is incarnate – being 
                                                            
65 Ibid. 
66 This theme began to take shape quite early in Bonhoeffer’s career.  Edwin Robertson 
sees it appearing already in Bonhoeffer’s inaugural lecture of 1930 (cf. Edwin Robertson, 
“Translator’s Preface,” Christology, pp. 10 ff. 
67 Discipleship, 221-222. 
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for others, loving the world, suffering.68  In this way, the community of disciples understands 
itself always to be bearing the image of Christ, an image which more often than not includes 
suffering, and which shapes the life of the church:  “But now the final word about those who as 
disciples bear the image of the incarnate, crucified, and risen Jesus Christ, and who have been 
transformed into the image of God, is that they are called to be ‘imitators of God.’”69 
For Bonhoeffer, it is clear that Christian discourse about humankind as the “image of 
God” or the church as “the body of Christ” is not simply speculation or figurative speech.  As 
God becomes incarnate in a real person, Jesus Christ, so the image of God and the incarnation 
take shape in real form – in humanity, in the church.  As Christ acts, so the church acts.  For 
Bonhoeffer, when the disciple encounters the other, inside or outside the church, the disciple 
encounters that one as Christ encounters them:  “Disciples can encounter other people only as 
those to whom Jesus himself comes.”70  In this understanding of the incarnation taking shape in 
the community of disciples, a way of compassion and solidarity is seen to be taking shape. 
 
3.2.3  Christ as Neighbour 
 The compassion and solidarity that grow out of this idea of the incarnation of Christ in 
the church show themselves in the life of the church.  There are points within Discipleship at 
which it appears that the presence of the incarnate Christ is confined to the church, and so 
serving Christ becomes a matter of serving one’s brothers and sisters within the church.71  There 
                                                            
68 Later on, in Ethics, this understanding will be worked out more fully in terms of 
conformation.  Larry Rasmussen highlights Bonhoeffer’s understanding that ethics, for the 
Christian community, is a matter of being formed and being conformed into the image of Christ, 
the incarnate one.  According to Rasmussen, Bonhoeffer sees an “ontological coherence of 
God’s reality and the world’s in Christ,” (Rasmussen, “A Question of Method, 108.), so 
therefore to act in “conformation to Christ” is to act “in accordance with reality.” (Ibid., 106)  If 
Christ is “humiliated,” the church acting in accordance with reality will be just as likely to see 
itself as “humiliated” than as “exalted.” 
69 Discipleship, 288.  The editors note the similarity between the German title of this 
work, Nachfolge, and Thomas a Kempis’ Imitatio Christi, the German translation of which is 
titled Nachfolge Christi.  For Bonhoeffer, “discipleship” is intimately linked with “imitation.” 
70 Ibid., 170. 
71 Cf, for example, Ibid., 198 (“Every service done to [the disciples] is done to Jesus 
Christ himself.”), and 213ff (Chapter Ten: “The Body of Christ”), in which Bonhoeffer discusses 
the community of disciples and his claim for its unique communion with Christ. 
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are also points at which this sense of incarnation in the church leads to an understanding that one 
is also served by Christ in the neighbour, especially the neighbour in the church.72 
 Bonhoeffer will not limit his understanding of the presence of Christ exclusively to the 
community of the church, though, for he also sees the incarnation beyond the church.  Once 
again, this understanding is rooted in his own grounding in orthodox Christian thought.  Since 
Jesus is believed to bear the whole of human nature and so to be fully human, all humans are 
understood to be “with Christ.”73  The community of disciples, then, is called to serve people 
inside and outside itself as though serving Christ. 
 Early on in Discipleship¸ Bonhoeffer makes the same point:  “Because the Son of God 
became a human being, service to God in worship can no longer be detached from service to 
sisters and brothers. . . . In Jesus, service to the least brother or sister and service to God become 
one.”74   It could be argued at this point that Bonhoeffer is not talking specifically about 
incarnation but is again functioning in the realm of ethical exhortation, suggesting that if the 
community of disciples wishes to show itself to be sincere it should be loving the neighbour.  
Two things need to be kept in mind, though.  We have already seen how Bonhoeffer wants to 
resist turning ethics or theology into principles and maxims to be applied to specific situations.75  
Bonhoeffer would not be content with simply saying that it is important to follow one’s words 
with appropriate actions.  More important, though, is the insistence that the body of Christ takes 
shape in the world, that the incarnation is flesh and blood, in the form of a person rather than in 
the form of an idea or a principle.  When Bonhoeffer, then, claims that “in Christ’s incarnation, 
                                                            
72 Although Bonhoeffer does not pick up the theme in Discipleship, Green sees this 
notion being worked out differently in Communio Sanctorum:  “God’s otherness is embodied 
precisely in the other person who is real and present, encountering me in the heart of my 
existence with the judgement and grace of the gospel.  In this way Christ is present pro me . . . .” 
(“Human Sociality”, 124)  A similar development occurs in Life Together, which Green quotes:  
“By hearing the word of God’s forgiveness pronounced by another, . . . I experience the presence 
of God in the reality of the other.” (“Human Sociality,” 126, quoting Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life 
Together; Prayerbook of the Bible,  Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, trans. D.W. Bloesch and H.J. 
Burntess (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 113. 
73 Discipleship, 217.  Note, however, that Bonhoeffer does follow this with a discussion 
of the special relationship of Christ to the church, which he discusses in terms of baptism, death 
and resurrection.  Although all humans are “with Christ,” the church is with Christ “in a special 
sense” – in faith.  This special relationship, however, does not preclude the understanding that 
Christ is present in those outside the community of the disciples.    
74 Ibid., 124. 
75 Cf. Ibid., 226 ff., and Rasmussen, “A Question of Method,” 108 ff. 
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all of humanity regains the dignity of bearing the of God,”76 he has real “humans” and a real 
“image of God” in mind.  The disciple does not serve humanity as a matter of applying an ethical 
principle.  One serves humanity because the incarnation requires space, the incarnate one takes 
up physical space, the image of the incarnate God is truly borne by humanity; and so the church, 
the body of the incarnate one, serves God by serving humanity. 
 This concreteness of the incarnation continues to lead to a sense of solidarity throughout 
Discipleship.  Solidarity, suffering and love come together as the work draws to a close:   
Whoever from now on attacks the least of the people attacks Christ, who took on human 
form and who in himself has restored the image of God for all who bear a human 
countenance.  In community with the incarnate one, we are once again given our true 
humanity.  With it, we are delivered from the isolation caused by sin, and at the same 
time restored to the whole of humanity.  Inasmuch as we participate in Christ, the 
incarnate one, we also have a part in all of humanity, which is borne by him.  Since we 
know ourselves to be accepted and borne within the humanity of Jesus, our new 
humanity now also consists in bearing the troubles and the sins of all others.  The 
incarnate one transforms his disciples into brothers and sisters of all human beings.77 
 
Discipleship is primarily addressed to the church, and concerns itself with the way the church is 
to understand itself and its life together.  It yields a kind of social ethic, insisting that Christ is 
incarnate in the community of the church, in which Christ’s image is formed.  With its emphasis 
on “conformation” to the image of God, Discipleship gives rise, as Larry Rasmussen points out, 
to what is “predominantly a churchly ethic.”78  But throughout the work, and increasingly in 
Bonhoeffer’s later works, the focus shifts away from the church and towards the world, and the 
incarnation takes shape in “the expanded ethic of the Christian in the world.”79 
 
3.3  Letters and Papers from Prison 
 In Letters and Papers from Prison, 80 we see the latest developments in Bonhoeffer’s 
thought, including the beginnings of the development of his thinking about “religionless 
                                                            
76 Discipleship., 285. 
77 Ibid., 285. 
78 Rasmussen, “A Question of Method,” 114. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison.  Enlarged edition.  Edited by 
Eberhard Bethge, trans. by Reginald Fuller, Frank Clark et al (New York:  Collier Books, 1972). 
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Christianity.”81   What has come to be known as religionless Christianity could just as easily be 
called “Christocentric Christianity,” for in developing this idea in the Letters and Papers he 
continues to develop themes that began to take shape in his earlier works, throughout all of 
which the question of the significance of Christ remains at the centre.  The decisive question 
raised in Letters and Papers is simply the now familiar question, “Who is Jesus Christ, for us, 
today?”82  In Letters and Papers, we see most clearly how this focused Christological thinking 
continues to move Bonhoeffer into the world, which is where he sees the church, the community 
of the incarnate one, finding its life:  “In Bonhoeffer’s thought this concentration [on 
Christology] does not lead to isolation from other theological and non-theological themes.  
Rather the centrality of Christ serves as the decisive motive for opening the horizons of the 
church towards the world in its concrete reality.”83  The focus on Christ corresponds to a 
growing openness to the world. 
 What is central for Bonhoeffer is the incarnation of God in the here and now, in the 
everyday things of life.  In place of the deus ex machina, the God who mysteriously operates 
behind the scenes to control the things that cannot be understood, Bonhoeffer sees the incarnate 
God as one who lives not in the realm of the unknown, but in the things that are known.  For 
Bonhoeffer this is essential, for the God who exists only as the explanation of things that are 
mysterious will soon be eliminated altogether as humanity’s understanding of the no-longer 
mysterious things of the world relegate God to fewer and fewer places of mystery:   
If in fact the frontiers of knowledge are being pushed further and further back (and that 
is bound to be the case), then God is being pushed back with them, and is therefore 
continually in retreat.  We are to find God in what we know, not in what we don’t know; 
God wants us to realize his presence, not in unsolved problems but in those that are 
solved.84   
 
                                                            
81 For a thorough treatment of the much discussed but largely misunderstood notion of 
religionless Christianity, see, for example, Ralf K. Wüstenberg, A Theology of Life: Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s Religionless Christianity, translated by Doug Stott, Foreword by Eberhard Bethge 
(Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, U.K.: William B. Eerdmans, 1998). 
82 Andreas Pangritz, “Who is Jesus Christ, for Us, Today?”  In The Cambridge 
Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, edited by John W. de Gruchy, 134-153 (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
83 Ibid., 134. 
84 Letters and Papers, 311. 
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For Bonhoeffer, the point is not to suggest that God is somehow one who solves problems for 
people.  Rather, the point is a Christological point:  As the incarnate one became incarnate in a 
particular time and place, and as Christ is present, taking up space, in the church and in the 
world, so for Bonhoeffer, God in Christ is only to be found in a particular time and place, not 
only in mystery but in the things that we know.85 
 In place of the deus ex machina Bonhoeffer sees the God who is present in what is 
known, even and especially when what is known is hardship and suffering.  In place of the deus 
ex machina is the suffering God, and “only the suffering God can help.”86  Here again, 
Bonhoeffer begins with Christology, with the incarnate one who suffers, and this one is seen to 
be one who “wins power and space in the world by his weakness . . . .”87  Clearly, Bonhoeffer 
sees God to be on the side of those who suffer and who are weak, not on the side of an 
oppressive state and an institutional church that continues to seek to define itself in the terms of a 
powerful nation and a perfect race.  Rather than siding with the powers that be, the church “is 
summoned to share in God’s sufferings at the hands of a godless world.”88   
Once again, the suffering God is seen to be incarnate in the suffering of the church and in 
the suffering of humanity.  This unity of Christ with all who suffer also underlies the unity of all 
that is.  Geffrey B. Kelly argues, against those who split the secular from the sacred, that 
“Bonhoeffer maintained that, in the reality of Jesus Christ’s human solidarity with all peoples, 
including the hated Jew and the despised socialist, God invests the world with a unity in which 
one’s faith and one’s ‘worldliness’ must be reconciled.”89  For Bonhoeffer, this reconciliation 
happens when the disciple and the church live fully in the world, as God became incarnate and 
lives fully in the world.  This is the religionless Christianity of Letters and Papers from Prison:  
God is incarnate in the everyday realities of the world, and the community of disciples is called 
to live its own life there. 
 
                                                            
85 For a discussion of the relationship of this thinking of Bonhoeffer to liberation 
theology, cf. Richards, Faith and Praxis in Liberation Theology, 363 ff. 
86 Letters and Papers, 361. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Geffrey B. Kelly, “Prayer and Action for Justice:  Bonhoeffer’s Spirituality,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, edited by John W. de Gruchy, 246-271 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), 248. 
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3.4  Conclusion 
 Bonhoeffer’s theology is radically Christocentric, focusing on Christ as the one in 
whom God becomes incarnate.  This is the starting point for all thought about God or humanity.  
For Bonhoeffer, though, this does not lead to exclusivism or to a sense of Christian superiority.  
From beginning to ending, ‘incarnation’ is really concerned with ‘the incarnate one,’ a living 
person who exists in solidarity with the world, whose very essence is to be “for others.”  
Bonhoeffer insists that Jesus Christ is always to be understood as the one who exists not for 
himself but for others – Christ pro me, Christ pro nobis.  As Bonhoeffer also understands the 
incarnate one to be taking shape in the life of the church, so also the church can only rightly see 
its own life moving in the same direction:  “The church is the church only when it exists for 
others.”90  
This understanding of the incarnation, and of the Body of Christ in the world, calls the 
church into a life lived in solidarity with the world.  For Bonhoeffer, the community of disciples 
will find their life nowhere else but in the world in which Christ becomes incarnate:   
The Christian . . . has no last line of escape available from earthly tasks and difficulties 
into the eternal, but, like Christ himself (‘My God, why has thou forsaken me?’), [the 
Christian] must drink the earthly cup to the dregs, and only in…doing so is the crucified 
and risen Lord with him, and he crucified and risen with Christ.91   
 
Real living, for Bonhoeffer, involves taking seriously “not our own sufferings, but those of God 
in the world – watching with Christ in Gethsemane.”92    
For Bonhoeffer, God is uniquely incarnate in the person Jesus Christ.  In this 
particularity, there is unity and solidarity with all.
                                                            
90 Letters and Papers., 382. 
91 Ibid., 337. 
92 Ibid., 370. 
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4.  SRI AUROBINDO: 
THE UNIVERSALITY OF INCARNATION 
 
 
 Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950, born Aurobindo Ackroyd Ghose) is widely recognized as 
one of the most influential thinkers and spiritual figures to arise in India in the first half of the 
twentieth century.  Raised in England, receiving an English and Christian education, 1 he 
returned to India in 18932 and immersed himself not only in India’s intellectual and spiritual 
traditions but also, from the years 1903-1910,3 in the political struggle against British rule.  As a 
result of his connection with the Nationalist movement, he was accused in 19084 of being 
involved in a bomb plot.  Although he was eventually acquitted, he did spend one year in prison, 
and during this time he had a number of spiritual experiences that profoundly affected his 
thinking.5  After his release from prison, he began to withdraw from political activity, settling in 
Pondicherry where he spent the latter forty years of his life.   
Although his own life appeared to be one of gradual withdrawal from active life, his 
teaching and writing continued to reflect the assumption that human spiritual development and 
engagement with the world are intimately connected.  In his approach to the subject of the 
avatara, Aurobindo insisted on seeing the spiritual and the material coming together; what are 
conventionally seen as two different worlds are in fact complementary, mutually affecting each 
other.  Based on the depth of his understanding of the pervasiveness of the Divine6 in all, he saw 
matter and spirit always together and in relation to each other:  matter itself is an expression of 
Spirit, and it is in the material world that spiritual evolution takes place. 
Aurobindo’s understanding of avatara and incarnation weaves its way throughout his 
broader perspective on humanity, history, and the Divine.  In order to follow his train of thought, 
                                                            
1 Georges van Vrekhem,  Beyond the Human Species:  the Life and Work of Sri 
Aurobindo and the Mother (St. Paul, Minn.:  Paragon House, 1998), 3-7. 
2 Ibid., 7 
3 Ibid., 9. 
4 Ibid., 12. 
5 Ibid., 17.  Vrekhem (10) notes that Aurobindo was first accused and acquitted in 1907. 
6 Following Aurobindo’s usage, when “divine” is used as an adjective, it will be written 
with a lowercase “d.”  As a substantive, it will be capitalized. 
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we will begin with a consideration of his Essays on the Gita,7 noting his perspective on the 
avatar Krishna and on the ways in which that perspective expands to a broader view of 
incarnation in humanity.  Second, by drawing on the Essays on the Gita as well as on the Life 
Divine8 and The Mind of Light9 we will examine how this notion is rooted in Aurobindo’s 
understanding of non-duality, which sees divinity and humanity, spirit and matter, as being real 
and being essentially the same.  From there we will move to a consideration of this broader 
notion of incarnation and its connection to Aurobindo’s evolutionary perspective.  Finally, the 
chapter will conclude with reflections on the relationship between avatar and incarnation, 
evolution, and solidarity.   
 
4.1  Essays on the Gita – the External and Inner Avatar 
Aurobindo’s approach to the avatar is set within the overall purpose of his study of the 
Bhagavad Gita: 
Our object . . . in studying the Gita will not be a scholastic or academical scrutiny of its 
thought, nor to place its philosophy in the history of metaphysical speculation, nor shall 
we deal with it in the manner of the analytical dialectician.  We approach it for help and 
light and our aim must be to distinguish its essential and living message, that in it on 
which humanity has to seize for its perfection and its highest spiritual welfare.10 
 
The avatar Krishna is the central figure of the Bhagavad Gita, and will be central to 
Aurobindo’s early discussions in Essays on the Gita.  In Chapter IV.5,6 of the Gita, Krishna 
makes the following claim for himself: 
Many births of mine have passed, O Arjuna, and so is it with you also.  I know them all, 
but you do not know them. 
Though I am birthless and of immutable nature, though I am the Lord of all beings, yet 
by employing My own Nature (Prakrti) I am born out of My own free will.11 
 
                                                            
7 Sri Aurobindo, Essays on the Gita (Twin Lakes, Wisconsin:  Lotus Light, 1995).  It 
should be noted that the Gita itself does not stand alone:  It is a small but very significant part of 
the broader Indian epic, The Mahabharata. 
8 Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine (Pondicherry, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1987.). 
9 Sri Aurobindo, The Mind of Light, Introduction and Annotated Bibliography by Robert 
A. McDermott (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co, 1971). 
10 Essays on the Gita, 8. 
11 Quotations of the Bhagavad Gita are from Sri Ramanuja Gita Bhasya, With Text in 
Devanagari &English Rendering, and Index of First Lines of Verses, Translation by Svami 
Adidevananda (Mylapore, Madras:  Sri Ramakrishna Math, no date). 
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Aurobindo’s view of the avatar follows this teaching of the Gita up to this point.12  
Krishna is “God himself descended into humanity,”13 the Divine taking on a human birth and 
living life behind the veil of human flesh.  While ordinary humans are born and reborn through 
no will of their own, in accordance with the dictates of their karma, Krishna’s birth is an act of 
his own will – “I create myself by my own maya” (IV.7).14  As a human actor in the human field 
of action, Krishna also acts as the Divine – albeit the Divine hidden in human form – who alone 
knows the purpose of each of his incarnations, and who is in fact the one guiding all of the events 
that unfold in the human realm, directing “from behind a veil:”15   
[Krishna] stands behind the great action of the Mahabharata, not as its hero, but as its 
secret centre and hidden guide.  That action is the action of a whole world of men and 
nations . . . . Until the moment when all has been pushed to the terrible issue of the 
struggle on the field of Kurukshetra and the Avatar stands at last, still not as fighter, but 
as the charioteer in the battle-car which carries the destiny of the fight, he has not 
revealed Himself even to those whom he has chosen.16 
 
There is mystery in Krishna’s activity:  Krishna is the “secret centre and hidden guide.”  But this 
mystery underlies the everyday and the tangible, the things that are not hidden.  If Krishna is the 
actor and the director of all that happens, it remains important to locate Krishna within these 
events.  The historical situation in which the Divine appears is important, and Aurobindo picks 
up this point.17  The Divine does not become embodied randomly or on a whim, but rather comes 
into the world in particular situations, in response to particular events.   
                                                            
12 His emphasis will eventually differ from the emphasis of the Gita, however.   See 
below, n. 20.  
13 Essays on the Gita, 10.  
14 The translation of Ramanuja’s Gita Bhasya translates maya - left untranslated in this 
citation - with the term magic.  Aurobindo does not understand maya to be ‘magic’or ‘illusion,’ 
but rather understands maya to be creative, projective power, the power of the Divine to self-
project in the world. 
15 Essays on the Gita, 10. 
16 Essays on the Gita, 14-15. 
17Julius Lipner, for one, agrees with Aurobindo on this point regarding the particular 
historical circumstances of the avatar.  An understanding of the Divine being universally 
incarnate does not suggest that the particular circumstances of the manifestation of the avatar are 
unimportant.  In fact, Lipner suggests that this is one of the significant differences between the 
understanding of incarnation in Hinduism and Christianity:  In Hinduism, the contingency of the 
appearance of the avatar is stressed, for the avatar appears according to the needs of a particular 
time and place.   See above, p. 26. 
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Aurobindo thus considers the historical situation of the incarnation to be of some 
importance.18  However, the importance of historical considerations begins to recede as the 
purpose of the incarnation comes into focus.  BG IV.7,8 hints at this:  
Whenever there is a decline of Dharma, O Arjuna, and uprising of Adharma, then I 
incarnate Myself. 
For the protection of the good and also for the destruction of the wicked, for the 
establishment of Dharma, am I born from age to age. 
 
Although the Gita is located in a specific historical context, we see here that the purpose of the 
incarnation is related to the more general situation of the decay of dharma, which can and does 
happen in any era.  In any such situation, the avatar’s role is spelled out to be that of restoring 
dharma, and here Aurobindo follows the Gita in stressing Krishna’s role as the restorer of 
dharma.   
Although Krishna is still seen to be responding to a particular situation by descending 
into a time of particular need, for Aurobindo the restoration of dharma and the particular 
historical figure Krishna take on a secondary importance – or, in the case of the historicity of 
Krishna, a greatly reduced importance, almost to the point of insignificance.  The restoration of 
dharma is not an end in itself.  The avatar does not simply come into the world to readjust the 
world and to force a correction of the way things are by acting upon a passive humanity.  If this 
were what the descent of God were intended to accomplish, the descent would be entirely 
unnecessary.  If “setting the world right” were what is needed, then a powerful God could 
accomplish this simply by acting from the heavens.19  Restoration of dharma, though, involves 
not just a reordering of world affairs, but more importantly it refers to a change that will take 
place in humanity.  The avatar manifests so that human nature can see and conform to what it 
sees in the avatar.20  If the particular avatar is considered to be important, it is only important 
                                                            
18 So he does note that “the historical Krishna, no doubt, existed” (Essays,12), although 
the context of the comment and the remainder of this chapter point towards a very limited 
significance of this historical Krishna. 
19 Essays on the Gita, 140. 
20 It is important to note that this emphasis on Krishna as exemplar is Aurobindo’s 
emphasis.  In BG IV.8 Krishna speaks of playing a more active role, acting on the world as a 
protector and saviour rather than simply serving as an example:  “For the protection of the good 
and also for the destruction of the wicked, for the establishment of Dharma, am I born from age 
to age.”  Aurobindo places relatively little emphasis on this role of Krishna as saviour.  This will 
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because the avatar demonstrates to humanity what it must become:  “The Avatar . . . is the 
manifestation from above of that which we have to develop from below.”21 
Clearly the descent of the avatar and the restoration of dharma serve a more important 
purpose, that of assisting the ascent of humanity “into Godhead.”22  The work of the avatar, then, 
does have a double sense: 
It has an outward side of the divine force acting upon the external world in order to 
maintain there and to reshape the divine law by which the Godward effort of humanity is 
kept from decisive retrogression and instead decisively carried forward . . . . It has an 
inward side of the divine force of the Godward consciousness acting upon the soul of the 
individual and the soul of the race, so that it may receive new forms of revelation of the 
Divine in man and may be sustained, renewed and enriched in its power of upward self-
unfolding.23 
 
The descent does not stand on its own as an important event.  Its importance is always tied to the 
enabling of humanity’s “upward self-unfolding.” 
There is a deeper level on which the particularity of the historical avatar fades in 
importance.  Although the avatar comes at a particular time in response to a specific situation, 
the avatar is not unique in the sense of being a fundamentally different being.  The Divine does 
not only descend in the birth of Krishna, or Rama, or of the Kalki avatar yet to come.24  It would 
be quite accurate to say that the Divine “descends” to earth in the birth of all beings, as 
Aurobindo points out:  “This eternal divine Consciousness [is] always present in every human 
being.”25  The divine presence is understood in two ways.  Sometimes – indeed very rarely – this 
presence comes about directly as a result of divine knowledge and will, with full self-
consciousness, and this embodied Divine becomes “the guide, teacher, [and] leader of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
be noted as a significant difference between Aurobindo’s view of the avatar and Bonhoeffer’s 
view of Christ.  See below, p. 79. 
21 Essays on the Gita, 148.  
22 Ibid., 140. Regarding the ascent of humanity, see below, “Evolution and Supermind” 
pp. 64 ff. 
23Ibid., 159. 
24 The Kalki avatar is believed to be the final avatar of Vishnu, and will destroy and 
recreate the world at the end of the Kaliyuga.  Cf., for example, “The Puranic Avatars:  The 
Buddha and Kalkin,” in Hindu Myths:  A Sourcebook Translated from the Sanskrit, translated 
and with an introduction by Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty (New York:  Penguin Books, 1975), 
231-237. 
25 Essays on the Gita, 11. 
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world.”26  This is the avatar.  In all beings, though, the Divine is present yet hidden, and the 
person in whom the Divine dwells might feel “something of the power or light or love of the 
divine Gnosis informing or conducting them.”27  It is this latter sense that seems to be most 
important for Aurobindo.  For this divine light, power, or presence within each is the same divine 
presence as that in the avatar.  The external manifestation in the ‘historic’ avatar is different 
than the internal manifestation which dwells in every human being only in degree of 
consciousness:  Krishna is fully self-conscious of his divinity, and thus not bound to the law of 
karma that binds the rest of humanity to the cycle of death and rebirth.  The divinity of the rest of 
humanity is veiled, and it is this which must be revealed.  Krishna, then, is seen by Aurobindo to 
be a model of divine self-consciousness to which all of humanity can strive.   
 The difference between the two types of incarnation can be further expressed in terms of 
knowledge and ignorance.  The presence of the one Divine in the avatar and in the ordinary 
person is seen in apparently opposite terms:  “The language of the Gita shows therefore that the 
divine birth is that of the conscious Godhead in our humanity and essentially the opposite of the 
ordinary birth even though the same means are used, because it is not the birth into the 
Ignorance, but the birth of the knowledge . . . .”28  The difference between the two types of birth 
is not, however, absolute.  Although Aurobindo speaks of the two as “essentially the opposite,” it 
is clear that they do not present a duality.  The same Divine is born in both cases, and the 
movement from ignorance to knowledge does not suggest a change into a different type, a step 
directly from one type to another, but rather an evolutionary change, a stage-by-stage movement 
in which one person, infused by the same divine presence, moves from being ignorant of his or 
her true identity to being fully knowledgeable of the divine presence.  
 For Aurobindo, then, the Divine eternally incarnate in all represents the highest 
possibility and the most important focus.  This sense of incarnation is more important than the 
Divine fully manifest in Krishna, or in any of the avatars:   
When we thus understand the conception of Avatarhood, we see that . . . the external 
aspect [i.e. The appearance in Krishna] has only secondary importance.  Such 
controversies as the one . . . over the historicity of Christ, would seem to a spiritually-
minded Indian largely a waste of time . . . . If the Christ, God made man, lives within 
our spiritual being, it would seem to matter little whether or not a son of Mary 
                                                            
26 Ibid., 12. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 147-8. 
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physically lived and suffered and died in Judea.  So too the Krishna who matters to us is 
the eternal incarnation of the Divine and not the historical teacher and leader of men.29 
 
Divine and human come together in every birth, and this is what is most important for 
Aurobindo.  The inner avatar, incarnate in all, is the expression of divinity that matters the most. 
 
4.2  Uniting Divinity and Humanity 
 The task of the avatar is to descend into the human realm; humanity’s task is to ascend 
to the Divine.  Although he speaks of the Divine and the human, the descent and the ascent, for 
Aurobindo the two will always go together.  Whether he speaks of inner divinity and outer 
manifestation, or of inner avatar and external avatar, central for Aurobindo is the concern to 
hold the human and the Divine together as one.  For Aurobindo, this holding together of the 
Divine and the human is fully exemplified in the avatar: 
The Avatar is always a dual phenomenon of divinity and humanity; the Divine takes 
upon himself the human nature with all its outward limitations and makes them the 
circumstances, means, instruments of the divine consciousness and the divine power, a 
vessel of the divine birth and the divine works. . . . [T]he object of the Avatar’s descent  
. . . is precisely to show that the human birth with all its limitations can be made such a 
means and instrument of the divine birth and divine works, precisely to show that the 
human type of consciousness can be compatible with the divine essence of 
consciousness made manifest, can be converted into its vessel, drawn into nearer 
conformity with it . . . .30 
 
 On one level, the two types of birth – the human and the divine – are the same, for the 
same Divine is born in Krishna that is born in any other person.  On a deeper level, both types of 
birth of the one Divine are embodied in Krishna himself:  The Divine takes on human form in 
Krishna’s human birth, and that human form becomes the means through which the Divine 
works.  Because this “dual phenomenon” is seen in Krishna, it is also seen in humanity:  the 
Divine is manifest in the human birth, and in this human form consciousness is drawn nearer to 
the Divine.  In the birth and the life of Krishna, the Divine descends and ascends; in the birth and 
life of humanity, the Divine descends and ascends. 
It remains essential for Aurobindo that this underlying unity of divinity and humanity be 
affirmed.  On the one hand, dualistic thinking threatens this unity, for such thinking will divide 
                                                            
29 Ibid., 12. 
30 Ibid., 155. 
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the Divine from the human, spirit from matter.  Yet Aurobindo also sees monism threatening this 
unity, and he sees two types of monism contending with each other:  One is a monism of matter 
that denies the reality of spirit, the other is a monism of spirit that denies the reality of matter.  
These are two misguided views of reality that broadly represent the west and the east 
respectively.  
Aurobindo refers to the first of these views as ‘the materialist denial.’ 31  The materialist 
denial is a denial of the Spirit, a denial which says that anything that is not readily apparent to the 
senses is a fabrication, an illusion, perhaps even a projection of hopes.  Aurobindo sees this as 
the negative side of materialism:  It becomes a “Monism of Matter”32 that denies the reality of 
Spirit.  According to this view of the world, Reason is limited to the domain of the senses and 
cannot go beyond the senses to any deeper knowledge.33 
The second kind of denial is the refusal of the ascetic34 – the refusal to accept the material 
world as having any significance.  In denying the material world as simply an illusion of the 
senses,35 the ascetic falls into a kind of monism of spirit, and fails to grasp Reality “in its full 
extent and comprehensiveness,”36 an extent and comprehensiveness which embraces the material 
world. 
 Both views offer an incomplete focus, a misguided emphasis on the one to the exclusion 
of the other.  So Europe has experienced “the fullness of riches and the triumphant mastery of 
this world’s powers and possessions” while at the same time it has moved towards “an equal 
bankruptcy in the things of the Spirit.”37  India, on the other hand, has experienced “a great 
heaping up of the treasures of the Spirit,” but has also found “a great bankruptcy of Life.”38  The 
one view refuses to see any reality or value outside of the material; the other view refuses to see 
any reality or value in the material. 
While rejecting the monisms of the materialist and the ascetic, Aurobindo at the same 
time insists that both perspectives have a positive expression.  So materialism is an affirmation of 
                                                            
31 Cf. The Life Divine, chapter 2. 
32 Ibid., 7. 
33 Ibid., 9. 
34 Cf. The Life Divine, Chapter 3. 
35 Ibid., 7. 
36 Ibid., 24. 
37 Ibid., 9 
38 Ibid. 
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matter and of the reality of the world of the senses, and it has done humanity a service, for it has 
swept away “the most perilous distortions and misleading imaginations,”39 it has done away with 
“perverting superstitions and irrationalising dogmas.”40  By removing what distorts and misleads, 
materialism has enabled the advance of knowledge, and materialism itself brings knowledge to 
the point where it is able to move beyond the limits of the senses and into a deeper inquiry.  
Likewise, the perspective of the ascetic has a positive expression, for it recognizes a realm of 
knowledge and inquiry beyond the uncertain and changing realm of the senses:  
[T]here is, attainable to us, a consciousness yet more transcendent, – (sic) transcendent 
not only of the ego, but of the Cosmos itself, – (sic) against which the universe seems to 
stand out like a petty picture against an immeasurable background. . . .   [It is] the one 
thing free from change, birth, [and] death . . . .41  
  
As materialism brings knowledge to the limits of the senses, the ascetic view opens up a 
perspective beyond those limits. 
Neither view is complete in itself, then, and Aurobindo sees the material and the spiritual 
as equally important and tied to one another: 
The affirmation of a divine life upon earth and an immortal sense in mortal existence can 
have no base unless we recognise not only eternal Spirit as the inhabitant of this bodily 
mansion, the wearer of this mutable robe, but accept Matter of which it is made, as a fit 
and noble material out of which He weaves constantly His garbs, builds recurrently the 
unending  series of His mansions.42 
 
Spirit inhabits matter, and matter is the means by which Spirit dwells in the world. 
 Aurobindo goes further and avoids both dualism and monism by continuing to 
emphasize that everything is an expression of God; the material world is itself Brahman’s self-
expression.  He is not treading any new ground at this point.  There are certainly echoes of 
Ramanuja and the idea of the world as God’s body, with the multiplicity of matter simply 
expressing the multiple aspects or qualities of God.43  The notion of the infinite taking on the 
finite is nothing new to the tradition to which Aurobindo belongs.     
                                                            
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 17. 
42 Ibid., 6. 
43 See, for example, Ramanuja’s commentary on Chapter 10 of the Bhagavad Gita, 
especially verses 19ff, for a clearer expression of Ramanuja’s understanding of the world as 
attributes of God and the world as God’s body (Sri Ramanuja Gita Bhasya, 325-353.).   
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 It is not surprising, then, that Aurobindo will even speak of God taking on limitations 
when taking on human qualities, and this will extend to his understanding of the avatar:   
Even human sorrow and physical suffering he must assume and use so as to show, first, 
how that suffering may be a means of redemption, – as did Christ, – secondly, to show 
how, having been assumed by the divine soul in the human nature, it can also be 
overcome – as did Buddha. . . . [T]he Avatar of sorrow and suffering must come before 
there can be the Avatar of divine joy.44 
 
Aurobindo even suggests that the avatar, whose consciousness of divinity far exceeds that of 
other humans, might still be taking on the human trait of a limited consciousness of divinity – for 
if the avatar appears in successive generations, at different points in time in an evolutionary 
process,45 then surely the final avatar will be one who has fully evolved in divine consciousness.  
So Krishna, for instance, could still be understood to be incomplete – the fullest expression yet, 
but not the fullest expression that could be.46     
 To speak in this way of divine limitation poses no problem for Aurobindo.  What might 
appear to Western consciousness to be a limitation of the infinite is, in Aurobindo’s view,47 
simply an expression – one of countless expressions – of the Divine’s being.  What appears to be 
divine limitation is simply the Divine becoming what the Divine will become.   
 Even if the Divine appears to become limited, this self-limitation is a power of the 
Divine – a “power of self-limitation for a particular working, . . . one of the powers we should 
expect to exist among the manifold energies of the Infinite.”48  As a divine power, even self-
limitation is no real limitation:  “The Absolute is not really limited by putting forth in itself a 
cosmos of relations; it is the natural play of its absolute being, consciousness, force, self-delight.  
The Infinite is not limited by building up in itself an infinite series of interplaying finite 
phenomena; rather that is its natural self-expression.”49  Earlier in The Life Divine, Aurobindo 
speaks of the same Infinite as being “so free that it is not even bound by its liberty.  It can play at 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
However, Aurobindo sees the approaches of all three of the major teachers of the schools of 
Vedanta – Sankara, Ramanuja, and Madhva – as deficient, each one overemphasizing one aspect 
of Brahman/the Divine to the exclusion of the others (Life Divine, 149). 
44 Essays, 156. 
45 See below, “Evolution and Supermind,” pp. 64ff. 
46 Essays, 157. 
47 He also argues that this is the prevailing Indian worldview.  See below, p. 63, n. 55. 
48 Life Divine, 595. 
49 Ibid. 
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being bound without incurring a real bondage.”50  This play takes place for a reason:  the infinite 
takes on a multiplicity of forms – and limits itself in these forms – so that the individual can 
evolve from ignorance into a deeper understanding of the unity in the multiplicity of the 
Divine.51 
 This incarnation in the multiplicity of forms extends to the human world, but also to the 
non-human and to the non-sentient world.  Aurobindo tells of a vision he received while he was 
in jail: 
I looked at the jail that secluded me from men and it was no longer by its high walls that I 
was imprisoned; no, it was Vasudeva who surrounded me.  I walked under the branches 
of the tree in front of my cell, but it was not the tree, I knew it was . . . Krishna whom I 
saw standing there and holding over me His shade. . . . As I lay on the coarse blankets 
that were given me for a couch, I felt the arms of Sri Krishna around me, the arms of my 
Friend and lover. . . . I looked at the prisoners in jail, the thieves, the murderers, the 
swindlers, and as I looked at them I saw Vasudeva, it was Narayana whom I found in 
those darkened souls and misused bodies.52 
 
In this we see an example of the breadth and the universality of the notion of incarnation for 
Aurobindo.  Troy Wilson Organ describes it well:  In Aurobindo’s understanding, “the cosmos is 
a working out of the being of Brahman.  Without this manifestation, Brahman would not be the 
All.  The world process is not a regrettable fate, nor a moral retribution, nor a tragic experiment, 
but a joyous expression of fullness of being.”53  The Divine taking form in the world is not an 
unusual occurrence.  It is simply the way the Divine expresses its infinite possibilities. 
                                                            
50 Ibid., 39. 
51 See “Exclusive Concentration and the Ignorance,” The Life Divine, 581-595.  
Aurobindo likens the “concentration” of the divine in the individual being to the concentration of 
an actor in a drama or an artisan in a craft, such that the actor becomes so involved in the work 
being done that he or she becomes oblivious to the world around and indeed even to the other 
aspects of his or her own life and being, even though these other things continue to exist.  The 
divine concentrates in the individual in such a way that the divine becomes unaware of the divine 
in all, in other aspects of the divine being.  Thus the individual, (and therefore the divine) can 
experience the joy of self-discovery, the joy of the broadening awareness of the 
interconnectedness of all the multiplicity of forms, the joy of moving from ignorance to true 
knowledge. 
52 Sri Aurobindo, Speeches and Writings, 90.  As quoted in Bassuk, Incarnation in 
Hinduism and Christianity, 68.  See below, p. 78, n. 2, for further discussion of the presence of 
Krishna and Christ in nature and humanity. 
53 Troy Organ, “The Self in Aurobindo.”  In Philosophy for the Left Hand (New York, 
Peter Lang, 1990), 112. 
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 This view of the Divine taking on a multiplicity of forms serves to underline an 
important element in Aurobindo’s thought and, it could be argued, a central perspective in much 
of Hindu thought:  If there is to be talk of incarnation in Hinduism, it is most important to speak 
as broadly as possible of this incarnation, just as Aurobindo spoke of the trees and the walls of 
his cell, as well as his fellow prisoners, as embodying the divine presence.  In Essays on the Gita, 
he makes the comment that this general notion of incarnation is in fact what makes the particular 
notion of the avatar so easily received in the Indian consciousness, which has a “strongly [held] 
belief in the reality of the Avatara, the descent into form, the revelation of the Godhead in 
humanity.”54  In Indian thought, this is simply how the Divine is manifest in the world – it is the 
logical outcome of a worldview that is millennia old. 55   
 The divine presence, then, does not single out the avatar  as unique – divine self-
consciousness does – for the Divine is present everywhere.  Thus, as a manifestation of the 
Divine, it is not the external avatar who matters. 56  The important avatar is always the inner 
avatar, the Divine present in all beings, in all forms.  This stress on the inner avatar overcomes 
both dualism and monism, and locates the incarnation of the Divine in all that is.  What the West 
                                                            
54 Essays on the Gita, 10 
55 Aurobindo contrasts this with his understanding of Western thought:  “In the West this 
belief has never really stamped itself upon the mind because it has been presented through 
exoteric Christianity as a theological dogma without any roots in the reason and general 
consciousness and attitude towards life.” (Essays on the Gita, 10)  Western thought, particularly 
Western Christianity, has presented incarnation as a particular  and unusual event that establishes 
the uniqueness of one person.  Incarnation is itself often thought of as what makes the incarnate 
one – for instance, Christ – unique.  
It could be asked whether Aurobindo is representing the notion of incarnation in the west 
accurately, though.  Although Western thought does not demonstrate the same general notion of 
incarnation that Aurobindo argues Indian thought has, the notion of God incarnate in Jesus is so 
ingrained in the west that it could hardly be said that it “has never really stamped itself on the 
mind.”  Further to this, the notion of a particular incarnation is not unique to Christianity.  In The 
Myth of God Incarnate, Michael Goulder and Frances Young engage in an interesting discussion 
about the origins of belief in incarnation, linking the notion of the divine birth in the exceptional 
individual (prophets, teachers, royalty, etc.) to a variety of Middle Eastern, Greek, and Roman 
motifs  (Michael Goulder, “The Two Roots of the Christian Myth,” in The Myth Of God 
Incarnate, edited by John Hick (London:  SCM Press, 1977), 64-86; Frances Young, “Two Roots 
or a Tangled Mass?”, in The Myth of God Incarnate, 87-121). 
56 Once again it should be noted that Aurobindo’s emphasis on the internal avatar differs 
from the Gita’s contention that Krishna the avatar comes to earth with a particular intention to 
save, not only to be an example or a teacher. 
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might call incarnation (with all of its connotations of uniqueness) is simply a matter of 
manifestation. 
As Troy Organ points out, this view of incarnation as universal manifestation ensures that 
it is not a static view, but is rather a dynamic one in which Brahman is truly becoming 
something.  Aurobindo sees the world as “the progressive self-manifestation of Brahman in 
time,”57 and the act of creation is connected to “Brahman’s movement of self-knowledge”58 in 
which he “find[s] himself in the apparent opposites of his being . . . .”59  Terms such as 
“progressive,” “movement,” and “finding” imply that divine revelation is an ongoing process, an 
uncovering, an advancing revelation.  Brahman is revealed to Brahman’s own self in the 
progressive revelation of creation:  “Aurobindo regarded the physical world of essential value, 
since it was for him the progressive self-manifestation  of Brahman in time.”60  The creation of 
the world is Brahman’s self-projection, a self-projection that happens in order that Brahman 
might see what it will become.61   
 
4.3  Evolution and Supermind 
 At this point, the most distinctive feature of Aurobindo’s thought begins to become 
clear.  This is his evolutionary perspective, a perspective that will also have implications for the 
consideration of the role and the importance of the avatar.   
 Aurobindo has already identified the problem of human ignorance.  Ignorance does not 
see unity:  It sees plurality or duality.  The individual in a state of ignorance sees himself or 
herself as a centre of perception surrounded by sense objects, things that are perceived and 
experienced, and that are separate from the individual.  With this perception, people learn to see 
the world as fundamentally divided between subject and object, between themselves – individual 
and independent entities – and all of the independent entities and selves that surround them.  
Persons in bondage to ignorance see themselves as separate from the material world, separate 
from the ‘animal’ world, and separate from the Divine.  Finally, such a perspective becomes a 
                                                            
57 Organ, 107. 
58 Ibid., 108. 
59 Ibid., quoting The Life Divine, 591. 
60 Ibid., 107 
61 Ibid. 
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kind of dualism of matter and Spirit.  There is a material, differentiated world, and there is an 
impersonal and undifferentiated Divine.   
What Aurobindo has proposed in order to mediate between these two is the concept of 
Supermind.62  Supermind is “a Truth-Consciousness…always free from the Ignorance that is the 
foundation of our present natural or evolutionary existence.”63  It is “an eternal reality of the 
divine Being and the divine Nature,”64 eternal, uncreated, and unchanging.  Yet at the same time 
Supermind is the means of the divine self-projection, which gives rise to the world, to the whole 
process of creation including the creation of humans who are in bondage to ignorance.  As such, 
Supermind is a Truth-consciousness that at one and the same time sees the divine unity, is the 
means through which the divine unity comes to be expressed in the diversity of creation, and is 
the source of an “involution,”65 from divine perfect consciousness to the Ignorance which is 
inherent in the life of the Divine embodied in material form.66   
 As the means through which the Divine becomes expressed in the multiplicity of forms, 
Supermind is also itself hidden in the world, “concealed behind this manifest mind, life, and 
Matter . . . .”67  As Supermind descends into the world, and as Supermind is already concealed 
within all that is, so Supermind will also act upon humanity, enabling humanity to continue to 
evolve in consciousness and to move closer to the goal of divine self-consciousness.68  The 
evolution of which Aurobindo speaks is thus an evolution of humanity back to its divine origins, 
                                                            
62 A full discussion of Supermind is beyond the scope of this paper.  See Life Divine, 
Book One, Chapters 14-18 (pp. 122-172) for a more detailed introduction to Supermind.  See 
also Sri Aurobindo, The Mind of Light – one of Aurobindo’s last writings - for a concise yet very 
full treatment of Supermind.  
63 Mind of Light, 79. 
64 Ibid., 80. 
65 By ‘involution’ Aurobindo means the movement by which the Divine becomes 
involved in the world of matter and, ultimately, ignorance, out of which divine 
consciousness will evolve.  See The Life Divine, 112ff., 129. 
66 Life Divine, 145-146. 
67 Mind of Light, 80. 
68 Aurobindo sees this kind of evolution as simply a continuation of the same process of 
evolution that has seen life arise from previously inert matter, and mind (particularly the limited 
but still highly developed mind of humanity) arise from life.  Evolution is always an ongoing 
modification of previous forms (cf. Mind of Light, 55).  The descent of the Supermind is an 
evolution into the very depths of matter.  The ascent of humanity to Supermind, to the divine 
consciousness, is a retracing of this evolution in the opposite direction, an evolution that has 
always been in process.  
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an evolution back to divine consciousness which first gave rise to humanity and to the created 
world. 
 The reality of Supermind for Aurobindo breaks down the duality between matter and 
spirit.  Supermind is “an already- and always-existent plane of being, the nexus of Spirit and 
Matter, holding in its truth and reality and making certain the whole meaning and aim of the 
universe.”69  Supermind is so inherently tied up with the universe that the evolution of the 
universe becomes not just a possibility but “the inevitable consequence contained not only in 
Nature as a whole but even in material Nature.”70  Evolution, as Aurobindo understands it, is not 
one possible option for the material world.  It is simply the universe becoming what it is. 
Thomas Aykara sees Supermind as the one thing that establishes and holds together the 
unity within the diversity, the divine presence in all; it is the mediator, the means of Brahman’s 
self-extension into external manifestation, the bridge of the gap, the combiner of “the impersonal 
Being, personal God and individual self into three inseparable and equally real modes of the 
supreme Reality.”71  Because of Supermind, the created world exists; because of Supermind, the 
possibility of realizing one’s own and the created world’s identity with the Divine exists.   
What the avatar presents to humanity is a model of this higher stage of consciousness, a 
stage that has moved beyond the ego-centric way of seeing and has evolved to the point of seeing 
all as a whole.  The avatar sees the perceived diversity of the world absorbed in a fundamental 
unity, and sees the unity of the Divine expressed, embodied, in the multiform universe.  This is 
not a consciousness that belongs to a different kind of being, it is simply a higher stage of 
consciousness to which all of the world is evolving, or could evolve.72  The avatar is fully 
                                                            
69 Ibid., 107. 
70 Ibid.,108. 
71 Thomas Aykara, “Meeting Between East and West: the vision of Sri Aurobindo.”  
Journal of Dharma 27, no. 2 (2002): 174. 
72 In The Mind of Light, however, Aurobindo shows signs of ambiguity regarding the 
question of whether all will evolve to the same level:  “How far this would go, whether the 
whole of humanity would be touched or only a part of it ready for the change, would depend on 
what was intended or possible in the continued order of the universe.  If the old evolutionary 
principle and order must be preserved, then only a section of the race would pass onward, the 
rest would keep the old human position, level, and function in the ascending order….But…a 
total change of the mental principle, such as has been suggested, cannot be ruled out as 
impossible.”  (The Mind of Light, 96-97). 
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conscious of being divine,73 is fully conscious that the Divine pervades all, and so naturally the 
avatar sees the unity both in the diversity and underlying the diversity.  A human still living in 
ignorance is not fully conscious of this, but since this is the consciousness of the one who 
pervades all, this consciousness can evolve in all.  While the avatar Krishna (or any other avatar 
in his or her own era, for that matter) is unique in this divine self-consciousness, the goal of 
human existence, in fact the goal of the cosmos, is to develop and go beyond this divine self-
consciousness to perfect knowledge, which sees the Divine as the all-pervasive source of all.   
 While the avatar does present this model of consciousness, and in an evolutionary 
perspective – based on the idea of Supermind – what becomes evident throughout all of 
Aurobindo’s thought is that the avatar as historical figure is not of any greater ultimate value 
than the inner avatar in all.  The external avatar merely points to the inner avatar and what it 
will become.  Brahman is incarnate in all, and all is evolving towards Supermind, so incarnation, 
avatarhood, or whatever it might be called, is most importantly understood as the inner Divine 
which all seek to recognize and which is evolving to Supermind.  The contradiction between 
matter and spirit is resolved, as matter is the means of Brahman’s self-revelation.  Far from being 
illusory, matter is the ground within which evolution takes place.  The human being, properly 
understood, is simply “the Divine in the individual ascending back out of limited Nature to its 
own proper divinity.”74  Spirit is manifest in all beings, with humanity as the highest expression.  
Spirit is not something to be thought of only as something to be realized in the next or in another 
life, it is rather something towards the realization of which humankind evolves now.  Even 
history comes to be seen in this evolutionary perspective:  “The history of the cycles of man is a 
progress towards the unveiling of the Godhead in the soul and life of humanity; each high event 
and stage of it is a divine manifestation.”75  It is not only human individuals or the human race 
that evolve; all of matter evolves, and all of time is evolution. 
The concept of evolution is important, for it distinguishes Aurobindo’s approach from 
one which would see the renunciation of matter and the denial of the body as necessary for 
                                                            
73 See above, p. 57. 
74 Life Divine, 150. 
75 Essays on the Gita, 361-362.  Although Aurobindo is writing at this point about the 
Vibhuti, and therefore is emphasizing the highest points of history and the great figures of 
history, it is clear that he sees this same evolution taking place universally, not only in high 
points of history or heroic figures.   
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spiritual growth.  Organ points this out and emphasizes that evolution is something that affects 
all matter:  “The evolutionary ascent to the spirit is an evolution of all planes of being, and no 
lower plane is to be sloughed off in the attainment of salvation.”76  Aurobindo argues that it is 
essential that all of nature be seen as something that will be integrated into the Divine in this 
whole evolutionary process.  Rather than being sloughed off, nature is taken up and integrated 
into the Divine.  Rather than being seen as illusory, nature is real, and is on an evolutionary path 
toward higher consciousness.   If all of creation, including humanity, is a projection of Brahman 
in the world, then to leave the material world behind would be to leave Brahman behind and to 
deny the fullness of Brahman as expressed in multiplicity.  Indeed, Aurobindo states that “we 
climb ill if we forget our base.”77  To leave behind the body is to leave behind a part of what is 
real and can only lead to an incomplete consciousness.     
 Finally, evolution is simply seen as the natural way.  It is not the special privilege of a 
select few or the life’s work of a chosen group.  Humans naturally aspire to the Divine, and “at 
the heart of this existential aspiration is the mutable Becoming of the immutable Being, a self-
projection of Brahman into the conditions of space and time…. Man becomes the incarnation of 
the Logos, the expression of the creative power; the absolute becomes involved in matter.”78 As 
the absolute projects itself and becomes, so the material world into which that absolute projects 
is itself becoming, evolving, seeking its own origin.  Thus, the descent of the Divine is at the 
heart of the ascent of the human.  The two are the same.  There is no duality, there is simply 
evolution – from the depths of ignorance into which the Divine has descended, to the heights of 
consciousness to which humanity ascends. 
 With this evolutionary approach, the importance of humanity could be said to equal the 
importance of the avatar.  For if the avatar comes to show humanity what it might become, 
humanity itself is seen to have a similarly lofty purpose:   
                                                            
76 Organ, 113. 
77 Life Divine, 36.  In his discussion of this same matter, Organ points out that from the 
beginning to the end of the evolutionary process, humankind is understood to be divine through 
and through, and so “Man does not become Brahman; he is Brahman.” (Organ, 117).   
 Having noted earlier (see above, p. 60, n. 43) the similarity between Aurobindo and 
Ramanuja, it is worth noting at this point that Aurobindo differs from Ramanuja on the matter of 
renouncing or not renouncing matter.  For while both claim that the created world is in some way 
an attribute or expression of God, Ramanuja sees matter as something “which deserves to be 
abandoned.” (Sri Ramanuja Gita Bhasya, 327). 
78 Aykara, 171. 
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Brahman is in this world to represent Itself in the values of Life.  Life exists in Brahman 
in order to discover Brahman in itself.  Therefore man’s importance in the world is that 
he gives to it that development of consciousness in which its transfiguration by a perfect 
self-discovery becomes possible.  To fulfil God in life is man’s manhood.79 
   
As Organ says, “Man must enlarge himself without losing himself; he must become God without 
ceasing to be man.”80  Humanity does not leave the material world behind to ascend to spirit.  
The world of matter is Brahman’s own way of being in the world, and it is within (not away 
from) this world that evolution takes place.  
The descent of God and the ascent of humanity come together in the evolving 
consciousness, in the Supermind.  The descent and the ascent are simply two divine movements:  
the involution into matter, and the evolution of consciousness to the Divine.  At this point, it 
appears that a shift has appeared, and the avatar is not even as important as previously claimed 
in the Essays on the Gita. In The Life Divine and in The Mind of Light, the descent of God and 
the ascent of humanity can happen without the avatar.  Yet it remains important to state that the 
ascent of humanity can happen only because the Divine has descended and is always already 
present in humanity. 
 
4.4  Incarnation, Evolution, and Solidarity 
One might expect to see this importance of humanity in the evolutionary process leading 
to a strong sense of solidarity, for if all humans share this value, then those who know this will 
feel a kinship with others.  Aurobindo’s work does indeed demonstrate this sense of solidarity 
based on notions of the value and importance of humankind, but the solidarity has deeper roots, 
roots that have already been touched upon.    
Aurobindo has argued that the highest aspiration for a person is to achieve that higher 
Truth Consciousness, to “become God” – the God which one already is – to discover Brahman 
as being fully within oneself.  The sense of solidarity in Aurobindo’s work becomes more 
prominent as he emphasizes the importance of discovering that divine presence outside of 
oneself as well:  “The liberated soul extends its perception of unity horizontally as well as 
vertically.  Its unity with the transcendent One is incomplete without its unity with the cosmic 
                                                            
79 Life Divine, 36. 
80 Organ, 115. 
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Many.” 81  Note the importance of this lateral extension.  It is not enough to be aware of one’s 
own unity with the Divine.  If this is not accompanied by an awareness of unity with all that 
exists, then it is an incomplete unity.  This kind of broadening of the sense of unity is not 
optional in Aurobindo’s thought, it is a requirement for the liberated soul:  “The individual being 
does not and cannot lose the consciousness of its identity with all beings and with the One 
Being.”82  The theme of the unity that underlies the diversity and the unity that expresses itself in 
that same diversity is a theme that feeds a sense of solidarity and is expressed here.  Organ notes 
this same connection between the inner and the outer:  “Until man turns his vision inward, he is 
separated from other selves and from God; in other words, he is separated from his own true 
being.”83  While this could suggest a withdrawal to the inner life (“until the vision is turned 
inward”), the connection between one’s “own true being,” “other selves,” and God suggests, 
once more, a unity of the inner and the outer. 
K.D. Verma sees a similar unity between inner and outer in all of Aurobindo’s thought.  
While it may be easy to divide Aurobindo’s life into two distinct phases – a political era and then 
the deeper and more reflective spiritual era – Verma sees Aurobindo’s spiritual vision in both of 
these eras, underlying all of his political activity and nationalistic aspirations, as well as his 
broader social and political vision.  He notes: “Aurobindo’s spiritual vision had enabled him to 
invest divinity upon his country, his land, and his nation, to see in each man the sleeping divinity 
that needs to be awakened, and to believe firmly that the solemn . . . affirmation of the will of the 
people can wipe out the stains of slavery.”84  Not even the nation as a form of matter is sloughed 
off, and the importance of the nation is tied to the elimination of slavery.  Moreover, the vision 
goes beyond nationalism, for “the divinity that was once attributed to the state is now vested in 
mankind as a whole, the divine humanity.”85  A worldview that sees the Divine in all could not 
stop with nationalism.  The “inner divinity” in the nation is also the inner divinity in the 
individual, and in either case it is tied to the good of others.   
                                                            
81 Life Divine, 40. 
82 Ibid., 139. 
83 Organ, 116. 
84 K.D. Verma, “The Social and Political Vision of Sri Aurobindo,” Through a Glass 
Darkly:  Essays in the Religious Imagination, ed. John c. Hawley, 206-227 (New York:  
Fordham University Press, 1996), 210. 
85 Ibid., 218. 
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  This sense of connection with others – whether “others” means individuals or the nation 
– is seen as being much more than some kind of optional activity in which one might participate.  
It is essential to any spiritual quest, and Verma points out that “Man creates his new higher self 
by participating in the good of others.”86  The movement seems to be from the outer life to the 
inner life:  One does not become liberated, enlightened, and then somehow “apply” that to 
relationships with the world; the search for the good of the other is in fact the means to one’s 
own awakening divinity.   
It seems possible, though, to see the relationship the other way, with one’s internal quest 
taking priority over the recognition of the Divine in the other.  Verma suggests this as well:  
“The individual has the unquestionable right to strive to achieve the highest form of wisdom, 
since it is only by awakening divinity in oneself that one would know how to apprehend divinity 
in another.”87  Here priority seems to be given to the inner quest, which then affects one’s outer 
vision.  In these two cases it could be tempting to see two contradictory visions, in which either 
the inner or the outer receives priority.  If a dualist worldview is maintained, then the two visions 
are contradictory – either the inner comes first and then the outer, or vice-versa.  The underlying 
theme of all of Aurobindo’s vision, though, is that of unity, the unity that underlies all diversity.  
In this vision, the inner and the outer are not two separate realms vying for priority, but are, 
rather, united – for Brahman is manifest in all matter.  In Verma’s reading of Aurobindo, this 
unity yields a kind of cycle, then: a cycle of evolution and solidarity.  Seeking the good of others 
leads to the growth of one’s inner self, one’s own awakening inner divinity opens one’s eyes to 
see the divinity in others, which strengthens the natural urge to seek the good of others, and the 
cycle continues on.  There is no duality, so the good of others, the divinity of oneself, and the 
divinity of the other are simply assumed, interconnected, one and the same.   
 This outward looking nature of the inward quest appears often in Aurobindo’s work, but 
most notably in Essays on the Gita:   
The man born to the divine birth has found the Divine not only in himself, but also in all 
beings.  He has realised his unity with all and his equality is therefore full of sympathy 
and oneness.  He sees all as himself and is not intent on his lonely salvation; he even 
takes upon himself the burden of their happiness and sorrow by which he is not himself 
                                                            
86 Ibid., 217. 
87 Ibid., 221. 
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affected or subjected.  The perfect sage . . . is ever engaged with a large equality in doing 
good to all creatures and makes that his occupation and delight….88   
 
Once again, there is not a duality of the inner search and the outer life.  The Divine is manifest 
within and without, and the inner quest is tied to the outer life. 
In the context of comparative thought and the challenge of religious pluralism, 
Aurobindo sees unity behind the diversity of the world’s religious traditions:  “The divine 
manifestation of a Christ, Krishna, Buddha in external humanity has for its inner truth the same 
manifestation of the eternal Avatar within in our own inner humanity.  That which has been done 
in the outer human life of earth, may be repeated in the inner life of all human beings.”89  Here 
we see again the significant priority that is given to the (universal) inner avatar, for the particular 
incarnations in historical figures are only isolated instances of the universal incarnation in all.   
Behind the varieties of avatars, vibhutis, religious figures and everyday people this inner 
incarnation reveals a fundamental unity.   
Aurobindo seeks to express this underlying unity as broadly as possible, seeing it 
underlying not just the multiplicity of religious figures but the multiplicity of belief as well:   
A unity behind diversity and discord is the secret of the variety of human religions and 
philosophies; for they all get at some image or some side clue, touch some portion of the 
one Truth or envisage some one of its myriad aspects.  Whether they see dimly the 
material world as the body of the Divine, or life as a great pulsation of the breath of 
Divine Existence . . . whether they worship [God] with universality as the cosmic Being 
or limit [God] . . . in humanity only . . . whether they perceive [God] as the Lord of 
Nature, Father and Creator, or as Nature herself and the universal Mother . . . the truth 
behind must ever be the same because all is the one Divine Infinite whom all are seeking.  
Because everything is that One, there must be this endless variety in the human approach 
to its possession . . . . All religions are seen as approaches to a single Truth . . . . For that 
which all our mind-knowledge and sense-knowledge and suprasensuous vision is 
seeking, is found most integrally in the unity of God and man and Nature and all that is in 
Nature.90 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 If solidarity is understood as a sense of being united – a sense of being united that 
inspires action together or action on behalf of – then Aurobindo’s work and thought clearly 
                                                            
88 Essays on the Gita, 189-190. 
89 Ibid., 151. 
90 The Life Divine, 699-701.  The entire quote should be consulted to appreciate fully the 
breadth of unity that Aurobindo is seeking to express. 
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expresses a kind of solidarity.  At the heart of all that he writes is the understanding that behind 
what we see and experience as multiplicity is indeed really a unity – for the Divine is involved in 
everything that is.  Multiplicity, rather than being understood in contrast to unity, is simply an 
expression of the infinite possibility of the Divine.  To be fully conscious of this unity, to know 
oneself and all else as divine, is the highest human aspiration.  Solidarity is inseparable from 
enlightenment, and to recognize this common divinity is to recognize one’s unity with God, with 
the other, with all others, with the world. 
 Solidarity takes shape on a number of levels.  In light of the breadth of this vision of 
unity behind diversity amongst religious traditions, Thomas Aykara sees implications for those 
who work in theology and the study of religion.  He concludes that Aurobindo’s synthesis calls 
on theologians of the future to 
open themselves [to the depth and power of human consciousness], and integrate their 
resources into the faith, lived out daily, in which they encounter in concrete form the 
human consciousness of God.  The emergent mysticism of Aurobindo, constitutively 
integrating unity in diversity, can possibly inspire theologians to create a more open and 
assimilative theology, especially in the field of theology of religious pluralism.91 
 
According to Aykara’s reading, theology itself can become an expression of solidarity.  
 In Aurobindo’s own words, the vision of unity – with the incarnate Divine at the heart 
of all – also brings together the perspective and the action of the contemplative and the activist: 
“[T]he quietism of the impassive soul . . . and the kinetism (sic) of the soul giving itself to Nature 
. . . are not a reality and a falsehood in perpetual struggle nor yet two hostile realities, one 
superior, the other inferior . . . ; they are the double term of the divine manifestation.”92  Because 
the Divine is manifest in all, and because the Divine acts in all, all paths are paths of the Divine.  
In this way Aurobindo seeks to express the unity of the Gita’s vision, but he also expresses the 
possibility of a unity or a solidarity between the monastic and the secular, between the ‘ivory 
tower’ and the street, between all realms of endeavour, in the East or the West, that are seen as 
being in conflict with one another or at least separate from each other. 
                                                            
91 Aykara, 176. 
92 Essays on the Gita, 135. 
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Finally, there is solidarity of purpose behind all of this action.  The one who sees the 
Divine in all is constantly seeking to help others to reach the same vision:93  The liberated soul 
sees God [in all] and has at heart for all the same equal kindliness, the same divine 
affection.  Circumstances may determine the outward clasp or the outward conflict, but 
can never affect his equal eye, his open heart, his inner embrace of all.  And in all his 
actions there will be the same principle of soul, a perfect equality, and the same principle 
of work, the will of the Divine in him active for the need of the race in its gradually 
developing advance towards the Godhead.94 
 
The expression of unity in multiplicity is at the heart of Aurobindo’s vision, and it gives 
rise to a sense of solidarity that includes all peoples, all of Nature, all realms of action, the 
variety of paths, and the goal and purpose of life.  This solidarity is seen in the life of the 
enlightened one, who seeks the good of all, and who works for the “holding together of the 
peoples, cikirsur lokasamgraham . . . .”95  It is more than simply a solidarity that grows out of an 
ethical exhortation, however.  Aurobindo the mystic and Aurobindo the activist are united by one 
vision of unity, a vision that sees the inner avatar at the heart of all; and all is evolving to a 
higher consciousness, a knowledge of oneness with this inner avatar.
                                                            
93 Aurobindo notes the similarity of this to the Buddhist ideal of the Boddhisattva.  See, 
for example, Life Divine, 40. 
94 Essays on the Gita, 174. 
95 Ibid., 130. 
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5  CONCLUSION: 
SOLIDARITY AND INCARNATION 
 
 
5.1  Similarity and Difference 
 This thesis has addressed a topic that initially seems to be a comparison of similar 
themes or similar doctrines.  Central to Christian theology is the figure of Jesus Christ, who is 
widely believed by Christians to be the incarnation of God – God in the flesh, living among the 
people of earth.  Central to many movements within the Hindu tradition is the figure of Krishna, 
who is widely believed by Hindus to be the incarnation of God, descending to earth in human 
form to live among the people of earth.  The similarity between the two seems obvious.  
 Yet a closer examination of avatara and incarnation has revealed that the similarity is 
limited and even superficial.  Looking for and considering the similarities between Christ and 
Krishna, and between the broader notions of avatara and incarnation, proves to be a limited 
undertaking, for the search for similarity soon gives way to the uncovering of profound 
differences between the two. 
 Solidarity, however, continues to emerge as an idea that can hold together similarity and 
difference.  Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer, as different as they are, were chosen for further study 
because a sense of solidarity can be found in their works.  When further study revealed the deep 
differences between their understandings of incarnation, solidarity emerged again as a common 
theme that arises from their different perspectives.  Solidarity – not similarity – seems to make 
possible not only the comparative task but also continuing conversation between those who truly 
differ.  
 
 In the initial chapter of the thesis, avatara and incarnation were considered alongside 
one another in the works of six thinkers, whose varieties of conclusions arose from a similar 
basic approach, an approach akin to setting the two objects of study on the table and examining 
them in order to discover the ways in which they are similar or different.  All of the writers in 
question sought to look for similarity and difference.  None began with the assumption that 
avatara and incarnation are the same thing under different labels.   
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The treatment was not always even-handed, though.  In at least one case (Bassuk), the 
attempt to respect difference eventually succumbed to an approach which located the origin of 
“the god-man” in a common human desire to see God.  Difference was respected on the one hand 
but reduced to a simple unifying human desire on the other.  In two cases (Parrinder and 
DeSmet), the attempt to respect difference was more successful in that the reductionist move to a 
common origin was not made.  The attempt began to fall short, however, when the examination 
of the doctrines in question became an evaluation of the doctrines.  This evaluation found the 
Hindu notion to be inferior – in terms of historicity, morality, and suffering – or at best to be 
incomplete, finding its eventual fulfillment in the Christian tradition.  In these cases, the 
Christian perspective was treated as the standard by which the Hindu belief is evaluated. 
 The last three writers considered in the first chapter of this thesis sought to maintain 
difference and to avoid either the reductionist move or the evaluative move.  Sheth, Lipner, and 
Yesurathnam examined the notions of avatara and incarnation and made deliberate attempts to 
ask further questions regarding the ways in which these two affected each other.  Rather than 
evaluating the Hindu understanding of avatara in light of the Christian understanding of 
incarnation, they considered the ways in which the two might affect each other.  Sheth and 
Yesurathnam focused their reflections on the ways in which Christian thought might be 
challenged by the avatara doctrine; Lipner considered this and began, if only briefly, to ask the 
question of how Hindu understandings of the avatar might be affected by the Christian notion of 
incarnation.  These latter three began to take the discussion in a different direction, for in their 
brief studies, the doctrines of avatara and incarnation were treated not simply as objects to be 
examined but also as living beliefs of living people; beliefs and people whose similarities and 
differences call for and inevitably produce interaction, conversation, and change.   
 
 The focus of the thesis then changed, narrowing to a consideration of avatara and 
incarnation in the work of two particular thinkers from within Hinduism and Christianity.  In the 
thought of Sri Aurobindo and Dietrich Bonhoeffer the ideas around incarnation and avatara were 
not examined at a distance – “on the table,” as in the previous section – but were seen to be part 
of the overall thinking and living of these two individuals.  The works of Aurobindo and 
Bonhoeffer reveal that avatara and incarnation are certainly not the same and are, in fact, similar 
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only in appearance.  Seeing the two doctrines at work in these individual believers yields a 
deeper understanding of the profound difference between the two doctrines. 
 
5.2  Particularity and Universality 
It soon becomes apparent that Christ and Krishna are very different figures for these two 
thinkers, and the difference is most apparent in terms of particularity and universality.  For 
Bonhoeffer, the particularity of Christ is essential.  He very clearly claims that the particular 
person, Jesus Christ, is the incarnation of God.  This incarnation is not a principle applied to this 
person, but this person is himself the incarnate one.  The centrality of this incarnate one is most 
important, and is expressed on a number of levels; Christ is at the centre of history and humanity 
and nature.  Moreover, Christ stands at the boundary between the individual, the world, God, and 
one’s own self.  The radical claim that Bonhoeffer makes is that all talk of God or humanity 
needs to begin with Christ, who is true God and true human.  He argues that Christ alone reveals 
who God is, and that Christ alone reveals who humanity is. 
This idea of particularity is important for Bonhoeffer, and it is important to note that only 
Christ is understood to be the full incarnation of God.  Bonhoeffer does speak of Christ being 
present in and as the church, taking up space in the world in his body, the church, and as being 
present in the neighbour – both inside and outside the church.  For Bonhoeffer, though, this sense 
of the presence of Christ is not ultimately a generalized incarnation or manifestation in all.  
There is not a broad principle of incarnation, but there is rather a particular person who is 
understood to be God incarnate.  Because this incarnate one reveals fully who God is and who 
humanity is, the community of disciples seeks to understand itself through this incarnate one – as 
being for others, as being subject to suffering and humiliation – and to understand the world and 
the people in it as the place in which this incarnate one is present – in suffering, in humiliation, 
in all those one is called to love.  A particular person is understood to be God incarnate, and the 
disciple learns to see everything in light of this particular incarnate one.   
For Aurobindo, this notion of particularity is not to be found.  In terms of the avatar 
Krishna, it is not important to claim a particularity in the same way that Bonhoeffer does.  
Krishna is not understood to be unique as the incarnation of the Divine.  Rather, Krishna is 
unique in his self-consciousness of being divine.  While Bonhoeffer sees Christ as the particular 
incarnation of God – fully God and fully human – and as present in the church and in the world, 
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Aurobindo sees Krishna as the descent of God into human form, the descent of the same God 
who is manifest in all beings, indeed in all that is.  For Aurobindo, the particularity of Krishna 
fades significantly, and there is not a centrality of the historical figure Krishna to correspond to 
the centrality of Christ in Bonhoeffer’s mind.  For Bonhoeffer, the particular incarnation is 
primary, and any sense of a universal incarnation is secondary.  For Aurobindo, the universal 
incarnation is primary, and the particular is secondary. 1   Aurobindo’s point of departure is 
always the Divine who is manifest – incarnate – in all.  The Divine is manifest in all – in the 
avatara and in all that is – and the disciple learns to see all that is in light of this manifestation of 
the Divine in all. 
 
5.3  The Purpose of Incarnation 
In addition to this difference of particularity and universality, there is a significant 
difference between Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer in their understanding of the purpose of the 
incarnation and the work of the one in whom God is incarnate.   
For Bonhoeffer, it would be possible to speak of Christ as the justifier and liberator – the 
justifier of humanity and history, and the liberator of nature.2  It is clear that it is through the 
incarnate one that these things take place, and only through this incarnate one are the divine 
promises to be fulfilled.  Christ as the incarnate one for others, and Christ as the incarnate one 
who is humiliated, is one whose life does something for humanity and for all creation.  Although 
Bonhoeffer clearly emphasized the importance of human action and responsibility, he also saw 
the incarnate one as one who acts in the world and acts for the world to do something that the 
world cannot do for itself.  In other words, the incarnate one – Jesus Christ – does something in 
                                                            
1 For a comparison of Bonhoeffer with a Hindu figure who sees the particular incarnation 
in Krishna as primary, it would be helpful to look at a thinker such as A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami 
Prabhupada, the founder of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON).   
2 Cf. above, p. 37.  In his discussion of Christ as the centre, Bonhoeffer gives only limited 
attention to a treatment of Christ as liberator of nature.  He sees the sacraments as signs of 
Christ’s liberation of nature, as Christ is ‘humiliated’ by taking the form of water and bread and 
wine, and these elements of nature are set free ‘to praise God.’  Sacraments, then, are a sign of 
Christ’s liberation of nature, not of an incarnation in nature.  Although his particularist 
understanding of incarnation does not allow him to move in the direction of Christ incarnate in 
nature - and thus in the direction of a universal incarnation more akin to Aurobindo - a fuller 
treatment by Bonhoeffer of Christ between God and nature might have made for further 
interesting comparison with Aurobindo’s perspectives on universal incarnation. 
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the world to fulfill the divine promise.  In this sense, the incarnate one is always understood to be 
a saviour. 
 For Aurobindo, the avatara acts in the world more as a teacher and an example than as a 
saviour.  While he does indeed speak of the avatara as the actor who controls the events of the 
world (or at least the events of the epic Mahabharatta), he does not see Krishna, or any other 
avatar, as one who does something to the world to save it.  In fact, Aurobindo does make the 
claim that if this were what the avatar were to do, there would be no need for the descent of God 
in human form:  The Divine could simply act from on high by divine decree to do whatever must 
be done.   Instead, Aurobindo understands Krishna to be the avatar who comes into the world to 
show humanity what it will become, to show humanity its own possibility of being fully 
conscious of its own divinity and indeed of the divine presence in all.  Krishna, then, is an 
example to humanity of the fulfillment of its own promise, its own potential.  Aurobindo goes 
further than this, though, and sees humanity fulfilling a similar function within the world.  If 
Krishna shows humanity what kind of consciousness it can achieve, humanity itself is 
understood to be Brahman’s way of embodying the possibility of this consciousness in the world.  
Krishna is the embodiment of perfect divine self-consciousness, humanity represents the 
possibility of this divine self-consciousness in the world. 
To put the difference another way, Aurobindo sees the incarnate one as one who teaches 
the world how to fulfill its own promise, while Bonhoeffer sees the incarnate one as one who 
does something in the world to fulfill the divine promise; For Aurobindo, the incarnate one 
shows the world how to save itself, while for Bonhoeffer, the incarnate one saves the world.3   
These differences are important.  If the apparent similarity of Krishna and Christ were 
simply to lead to the conclusion that each is an example of a saviour figure, a divine teacher, or 
even, as Bassuk and others seek to do, a ‘god-human’ or ‘human-god,’ then the two would be 
reduced to variations on a theme or of a religious ‘type.’ If these important figures are 
understood only as variations of a certain type, then the respective traditions in which they are 
                                                            
3 Cf. above, p. 36ff., and p. 55ff.  The distinction between the incarnate one as exemplar 
(Aurobindo) and the incarnate as saviour (Bonhoeffer) cannot be generalized to reflect their 
respective religious traditions.  For Aurobindo, the avatar as exemplar is central, even though 
some movements within Hinduism would see the avatar as a saviour (and the Gita itself inclines 
this way).  Likewise, while Bonhoeffer stresses Christ as Saviour, the understanding of Christ as 
exemplar can also be found within Christianity. 
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worshipped can also too easily be reduced to variations on a theme.  Uniqueness takes a back 
seat to similarity.  Examination of the two in terms of their differences, though, yields a much 
deeper picture of each.  Without evaluating the merits of one in terms of the other, it has been 
seen that in the thought of Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer the figures of Krishna and Christ are 
understood very differently, in terms of universality or particularity and in terms of their purpose 
and work.   
 
5.4  Different yet Similar 
  The circumstances in which Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer lived and worked share some 
significant similarities.  Aurobindo had lived and studied in England, being exposed at an early 
age to religious, philosophical, and social thought much different than that of his native India.  In 
his life experience he had had extensive contact with ‘the other.’  Bonhoeffer also had experience 
outside of his home country, studying and working at various times in the United States and 
England, as well as visiting Mexico with the French pacifist Jean Laserre.4  Although this 
exposure remained within ‘the west,’ it does indicate an openness to a broader range of thought, 
and his interest in visiting and learning from Gandhi reinforces this impression of openness to 
‘the other.’5   
In their own home countries, the two also found themselves in similar circumstances.  
Both India and Germany at the time were at significant and turbulent crossroads in their national 
histories.  India was moving from colonial rule to independence, from bondage to freedom; 
Germany was moving the other way, slipping into totalitarian rule.  Both Bonhoeffer and 
Aurobindo were imprisoned as a result of their opposition to the reigning political authorities, 
and each experienced a shift and a deepening in their thought during the experience of 
imprisonment.   
 Given the character of the political events, and given their involvement in these events, 
it is not surprising that both Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer eventually move away from discussions 
that might be content with focusing only on the person of Krishna or Christ  – examining them 
                                                            
4 Ernst Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 197.   
5 For more on Bonhoeffer’s interest in and contact with Gandhi, see Feil, 197ff., 240 n. 
248; and Larry Rasmussen, “The Ethics of Responsible Action,” The Cambridge Companion to 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, edited by John W. de Gruchy, 206-225 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 207ff. 
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“on the table,” again – and they move their discussions to the person and work not of the 
incarnate one or the avatar but of the disciple, the devotee, the community.  Krishna as one in 
whom the Divine is manifest is seen to be one who is not reducible to a doctrine, but who shows 
the devotee, indeed all of humanity, what it can become.  Likewise, Christ as the incarnate one 
for others in Bonhoeffer’s thought does not become an object of extended study, but rather 
comes to be seen as the subject who acts on the church and who calls the disciples to be people 
for others.  Although there are deep differences between their understandings of Krishna and 
Christ, both Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer see them as ones who call their followers to a task, 
whether that task is to follow the incarnate one or to seek to attain the same divine self-
consciousness that belongs to the avatar. 
 Similarly, both Bonhoeffer and Aurobindo express a deep sense of solidarity that grows 
out of their understanding of what incarnation means and how it takes place in the world.  We 
have seen how the particularity of Christ stands out in Bonhoeffer’s thought.  Yet the 
particularity of Christ does not lead Bonhoeffer to a position from which he judges the other, 
particularly the non-Christian other.  For Bonhoeffer it is essential that this particular incarnate 
one exists for others, and is somehow present in living form – in the church – and in all of 
humanity.  The incarnate one is a particular flesh-and-blood human, so this incarnate one is also 
present in particular flesh-and-blood humans, in particular times and places, and especially in 
those who are suffering.  For Bonhoeffer, the disciple of Christ must feel a sense of solidarity 
with the other, for Christ lived for the other.  On a different level, though, it is clear that for 
Bonhoeffer all of humanity – even “the hated Jew and the despised socialist”6 – is united by 
God’s incarnation in Christ, for all of humanity now bears the image of God.  Rather than 
dividing the world, the uniqueness of the incarnation unites the world, and calls the disciple to 
solidarity with the other. 
 The suggestion that Bonhoeffer extended this sense of solidarity beyond the exclusive 
confines of the church is strengthened by his brief contact with Gandhi and by his interest in 
learning from this follower of another religious tradition.  Larry Rasmussen points out that 
“already in 1932 this young German professor was attracted to Mahatma Gandhi because he 
                                                            
6 Geffrey B. Kelly, “Prayer and Action for Justice:  Bonhoeffer’s Spirituality,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, edited by John W. de Gruchy, 246-271 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), 248. 
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sensed that a kind of exhaustion had befallen Western Christian spirituality and ethics.  
‘Christianity in other words and deeds’ might be discovered, by contrast, in Gandhi and the 
East.”7  Very early on, then, Bonhoeffer was looking beyond the Christian church that he knew, 
not only expressing solidarity with the other who suffers, but also finding solidarity with the 
other from whom he might learn. 
 Aurobindo’s sense of solidarity grows out of his belief in the manifestation of God in 
all.  From his experience of being surrounded by Narayana in prison to his insistence that all of 
the material world is a working out of the being of Brahman, Aurobindo’s work is infused with a 
sense of the all-pervasiveness of the Divine, and the task of humanity is to attain to a fuller 
consciousness of this divine presence and indeed of each person’s own divinity.  Yet Aurobindo 
does not call the devotee to a work of self-realization that focuses only on one’s own unity with 
the Divine.  One’s own sense of unity with the Divine must be matched by a sense of unity with 
others.  As was pointed out by Verma, the relationship between the good of others and one’s own 
self-understanding is reciprocal:  Seeking another’s well-being is a path to recognizing the divine 
in oneself, and recognizing the divine in oneself opens one’s eyes to see the divine in the other – 
the other religion, the other nation, the other person.8 
 It is this sense of solidarity that appears to be the most important thing in the 
comparison of Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer.  Although each understands the idea of incarnation 
very differently, it appears that for both of them incarnation overcomes the duality between God 
and the world.  Aurobindo’s universalist sense of incarnation moves him to see the Divine 
manifest in everything, and to call the devotee to learn to see the world and all its people in this 
same way.  Bonhoeffer’s particularist notion of incarnation is also one that overcomes the duality 
between God and the world, for in this particular flesh-and-blood person he understands God to 
be fully present in the world as a real human being.  It has also been shown that for both of these 
                                                            
7Larry Rasmussen, “The Ethics of Responsible Action,” 207.  ‘Christianity in other words and 
deeds’ is Rasmussen’s translation of an expression in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “Brief an Helmut 
Roessler,” Ökumene: Briefe Aufsätze Dokumente 1928-1942, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1 
(Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1958), 61. Feil notes that this interest in the practice and faith of 
Gandhi was a source of bewilderment for Karl Barth and others who might otherwise be seen as 
allies of Bonhoeffer (240, n. 248). 
8 K.D. Verma, “The Social and Political Vision of Sri Aurobindo,” Through a Glass 
Darkly:  Essays in the Religious Imagination, edited by John c. Hawley, 206-227 (New York:  
Fordham University Press, 1996), 217-221.  See also above, p. 71. 
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thinkers, incarnation overcomes the duality between people, for both Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer 
speak (albeit in different ways) about seeing the Divine, seeing God, in the people and the world 
around them.  The differences in their perspectives are important, yet solidarity continues to 
emerge as a point of contact between these different perspectives. 
 This thesis began with a notion of similarity:  within two religious traditions there is a 
“god-human” figure, a divine incarnation or a divine descent who holds a central position within 
those traditions.  A closer look at the significance of these two particular figures revealed that the 
similarity is not a deep similarity, and that the differences do in fact run very deeply. Yet it is 
possible to move from that place of recognizing deep difference to a place where the different 
views still reinforce a sense of solidarity.   
 Similarity and difference, then, are not absolute.  They exist in a dialectical relationship 
which keeps comparative religious thought moving, rather than settling into a reductionist 
position on the one hand or to a position that sees difference as ultimately dividing, on the other.  
The idea of solidarity enables this movement in comparative thought to continue. 
 
5.5  Further Directions 
Further study could be pursued in a number of directions at this point.  The theme of 
incarnation and solidarity could be further examined.  Having begun to look at the theme in 
Bonhoeffer and Aurobindo, it could be expanded to include other thinkers, perhaps 
representative thinkers for whom solidarity and liberation have been important themes.  What is 
the role of incarnation in the thinking of these?  Is there a role?  How does a solidarity informed 
by incarnation differ from one that is not?  On the Christian side, much has been made in 
liberation theology of Christ’s identification with the poor and oppressed in particular historical 
instances.  Edilberto Merida’s sculpture of the crucified Jesus as an indigenous Peruvian comes 
to mind.9  Is this kind of image of solidarity enhanced or impeded by the particularity of 
incarnation that is so prevalent in Christianity?  Is this kind of image of solidarity enhanced or 
impeded by a more universalistic notion of incarnation that is present in much of Hinduism? 
                                                            
9 This image can be seen on the cover of Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation:  
History, Politics, and Salvation, revised ed., translated and edited by Sister Caridad Inda and 
John Eagleson (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1988). 
84 
 
The consideration of the views of both Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer would suggest that 
there is no clear answer to this question.  Perhaps, rather, the particular and the universal come 
together in the notion of solidarity.  The particularity of the incarnation in Christianity is 
universalized in the infinite particulars of human life, and the universality of the incarnation in 
Hinduism takes concrete form in specific people and places.  Solidarity universalizes the 
particular and specifies the incidence of the universal.   
More broadly speaking, this could lead to considerations of the relationship between 
theology and praxis or between thinking and acting.  For Aurobindo or Bonhoeffer (or for other 
thinkers inclined towards solidarity), do the ideas inherent in an inherited religious tradition 
shape the way they view the world and act in the world, or does a life experience that calls for 
solidarity shape the ideas of the thinker?  On the one hand, this is obviously a “chicken-and-egg” 
kind of question that has no clear answer.  On the other hand, it is interesting to see how 
solidarity takes such strong shape in such a variety of cultures and traditions.  The experience 
that calls for solidarity also calls for a reading of one’s religious tradition in light of that 
experience.  Then, of course, this understanding of one’s tradition leads to a different view of 
one’s situation. 
Similarly, it could be fruitful to consider the relationship between incarnation and 
solidarity in feminist thought.  If one holds to a particularist notion of incarnation, what is the 
role of a male incarnate being in theology that seeks to work from a feminist perspective?  
Again, is either perspective – the particular or the universal – understood to help or to hinder 
feminist theological reflection?  Does that particularity pose a problem for feminist thought? 
 To continue the broader purpose of this study, one could continue to look at similarity 
and difference in comparative religious thought and in the encounter of different religious 
traditions.  Having now looked at similarity and difference in light of two particular thinkers 
from different traditions, perhaps more attention could be given to what happens when a thinker 
from one tradition encounters the ideas of another tradition or of the religious “other.”  What is 
the interplay of similarity and difference in such encounters?  Here again, solidarity could be 
seen to be playing a significant role, but in this case ‘solidarity’ would not only imply connection 
to those who suffer; it would refer to a sense of connection with the ‘other,’ particularly the 
religiously ‘other.’  
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 This direction would perhaps be the most interesting one to pursue, and the study could 
proceed in a number of directions.  For instance, Mohandes K. Gandhi refers often to his 
encounters with Christianity.  His contact with Christianity is well known, and he himself notes 
on several occasions how he has been influenced by certain teachings of Christianity, particularly 
those found in the Sermon on the Mount.  Similarly, Aurobindo had extensive contact with 
Christian thought, and several articles have looked more deeply at that contact.10  It may be 
interesting to look at Gandhi or Aurobindo or to other Hindu approaches to Christianity and ask 
“How does the incarnate one of Christianity affect the view of the avatar among Hindu 
thinkers?”11  Along this line, one can only speculate about what may have happened in the 
thought of Bonhoeffer if he had been able to carry out his plans to travel to India to work and 
study with Gandhi.  How would this encounter have affected his own view of the incarnate one 
and the particularity of the incarnation?   
 A further pursuit of questions such as these is important in that it treats what are usually 
called doctrines and ideas not as objects to be examined at a distance (again, “on the table”), but 
as living things that shape the ways that people understand the world and their place in it.  By 
considering the thought of Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer in isolation from each other, this thesis has 
treated doctrine in such a way.  The interesting next step would be to look more closely at what 
happens when these ways of understanding the world come into contact with each other.  The 
comparative study of religion needs to take this into account, for ideas always exist in 
communities of people who come into contact with each other and who have an influence on 
each other. 
 Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty’s work would be a helpful starting point in this regard.  In 
Other Peoples’ Myths12  she considers what happens to all kinds of people – scholars, laypeople, 
devotees and doubters – when they encounter the religion of the other.  More particularly, she 
                                                            
10 See, for example, Aurabinda Basu, “Sri Aurobindo on Christ and Christianity,” in Neo-
Hindu Views of Christianity, edited by Arvind Sharma, 182-212 (Leiden, The Netherlands:  E.J. 
Brill, 1988). 
11 See, for example, Aurabinda Basu, “An Indian View of Christ,” in Religion in the 
Pacific Era, edited by Frank K. Flinn and Tyler Hendricks, 179-187 (New York: Paragon House, 
1985), and Deepak Sarma, “Is Jesus a Hindu? S.C Vasu and Multiple Madhva 
Misrepresentations,” in Hindu-Christian Studies Bulletin 13 (2000): 19-25. 
12 Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty,  Other Peoples’ Myths:  The Cave of Echoes  (Chicago 
and London:  University of Chicago, 1988). 
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asks what happens when one encounters the myths of another, concluding that “we may take 
other peoples’ myths as a source of advice about what to do about our lives.”13   
At one point Doniger tells the Indian story of King Bhoja, who while bathing finds that a 
tiny fish has entered his head, and the presence of the fish in his head eventually drives him 
crazy.  She suggests that the king’s real difficulty is that he “cannot stand having other peoples’ 
ideas inside his own head.”14  This is precisely what is happening, though, when one encounters 
the ideas, beliefs, and myths of another religious tradition – the welcoming of the ideas of 
another into our own heads.  “The way to learn about others,” she continues,  
is not to become a fish forever (to convert, to [for example] become a Hindu) but to 
remain yourself as you get inside a fish for a little while or live among the fish, a Jew or 
Christian among the Hindus.  To attempt to do this is to attempt to become . . . both 
things at once, taking a fish or a Hindu into your head while maintaining it as your head 
at the same time.15   
 
The language and the imagery is odd, but Doniger touches on questions of similarity and 
difference, and how these play out in the encounter of two different traditions.  What happens 
when other fish swim around in one’s head?  What happens when they appear to be the same?  
To be different?  Doniger insists that these encounters change the people involved.   
 Doniger’s perspective is still somewhat of an outside perspective, though.  
Autobiographical accounts would shed a different light on the matter of similarity and difference.  
Swami Abhishiktananda (born Henri Le Saux) is a Christian who embraced both an Adviatan 
worldview and the life of the Sanyassin, and much of his written work seeks to express the 
results of the meeting of these two worldviews with the Christian faith he continued to hold. 16  
To use the terms that Doniger suggests, Abhishiktananda’s work is an articulation of what 
happens when two fish swim in the same head.   
As a similar approach, but dealing more specifically with theology and Christology, the 
work of Raymon Panikkar bears further study.  In The Trinity and the Religious Experience of 
                                                            
13 Ibid., 6. 
14 Ibid., 80 
15 Ibid., 94-95. 
16 See Henri Le Saux, Saccidananda: A Christian Approach to Advaitic Experience 
(Delhi:  ISPCK, 1997) and J. Monchanin and Henry Le Saux, A Benedictine Ashram (Douglas: 
Times Press, 1964). 
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Man,17 Panikkar (who identifies himself at various times and often at the same time as Christian, 
Hindu, Buddhist and Secularist)18 seeks to articulate Christian Trinitarian theology in light of the 
three Hindu paths of karmamarga, bhaktimarga, and jnanamarga.  Along a similar line, one of 
Panikkar’s most well known (and unfortunately named) works is entitled The Unknown Christ of 
Hinduism.19  Although the title would suggest that in this work Hindu thought is simply 
subsumed under Christian thought (along of the lines, for example, of Parrinder’s view of Christ 
as the fulfillment of Hindu ideas about the avatar), Panikkar does seek to uphold the integrity of 
both traditions, which would make this a particularly interesting study when viewed in the light 
of similarity and difference.  In a later work, Panikkar even suggests that difference is essential 
and that plurality in the world and even in one’s own thinking is necessary and healthy.  A study 
of Panikkar’s work would be interesting alongside, for instance, the work of Radhakrishnan on 
the Hindu side or John Hick on the Christian side.20   
 Finally, a more purely autobiographical account could be found in the work of Dianna 
L. Eck, particularly in her work Encountering God: a spiritual journey from Bozeman to 
Benares.21  In this work Eck, a Christian who teaches Comparative Religion and Indian Studies 
at Harvard University, gives an account of her extensive contact with Hinduism, which for her 
has been both deeply academic and deeply personal.  Of particular interest in this work would be 
Chapter 4, “The Faces of God:  Discovering the Incarnation in India.”22  In this chapter she 
articulates the ways in which her encounter with Krishna and with the devotees of Krishna has 
affected her own faith and her own understanding of who Christ is.  A further study of some of 
Eck’s work would provide an opportunity to explore the topic of similarity, difference, and 
                                                            
17 Raimundo Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon, Person, 
Mystery (New York: Orbis, 1973).  Note that Panikkar’s given name is variously spelled 
“Raimundo,” “Raymon,” or “Raymond.” 
18 See Raimon Panikkar, “The Dawn of Christianness.” Cross Currents (Spring/Summer 
2000), 185-195; “Eruption of Truth:  An Interview with Raimon Panikkar.” Christian Century 
117 (Aug 16-23, 2000).  834-836; Fred Dallmayr, “Rethinking Secularism (with Raimon 
Panikkar).  The Review of Politics 61 (Fall1999), 715-735. 
19 Raymond Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism (London:  Dartman, Longman, 
and Todd, 1964.). 
20 Raimundo Panikkar, Invisible Harmony:  Essays on Contemplation and Responsibility 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995). 
21 Diana L. Eck,  Encountering God: a spiritual journey from Bozeman to Benares  
(Boston:  Beacon Press, 1993.) 
22 Ibid., 81-117. 
88 
 
solidarity on a very different level.  Hers is not a comparison of two doctrines as they are laid out 
on the table, nor is it an examination of two thinkers from different traditions seeking to 
articulate their theological and philosophical perspectives.  Hers is a specific example of a 
working out of the theme of similarity and difference in the ideas of incarnation and avatara. 
All of these suggestions for further explorations have in mind a broader and deeper look 
at the interplay of similarity and difference in the study of religion.  Focusing on difference 
respects the identity of the other, avoids reductionism, and deepens the understanding of the 
other.  Yet all of these suggestions for further thought are concerned with what happens when 
‘others’ are brought together, when the ‘different’ come near to each other in solidarity. 
 
5.6  Conclusion – Solidarity, Similarity, and Difference 
 This thesis began with an exploration of similarity and difference in the comparative 
study of religion, noting that the recent tendency has been to focus on difference.  The 
examination of the works of Sri Aurobindo and Dietrich Bonhoeffer was carried out with a view 
towards focusing on the difference between these two thinkers in their understandings of 
incarnation.  The study has led to a deeper understanding of each thinker and also to an 
appreciation of the important role of incarnation in their thought.  The understanding of 
incarnation and the role that it plays in their respective traditions has been seen to be very 
different, yet it has been shown that this difference does in fact give rise to similarity as well.  
Both Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer move from the presence – differently understood – of God in 
humanity to a sense of solidarity with humanity.  In both thinkers, it can be seen that the doctrine 
of incarnation breaks down the sense of duality between the Divine and the world.  Aurobindo’s 
universalist understanding of incarnation and Bonhoeffer’s particularist understanding of 
incarnation both result in the view that the Divine is truly present in the world.  This breaking 
down of the duality between God and the world also heightens the sense of solidarity in each 
thinker’s work, as both Bonhoeffer and Aurobindo speak of the presence of Christ or the Divine 
in the community and in the neighbour.   
The study of avatara and incarnation in Aurobindo and Bonhoeffer has demonstrated 
the importance of the interplay between similarity and difference in the comparative study of 
religion.  It began with the seemingly similar ideas of avatara and incarnation, it focused on the 
difference between these ideas, and it returned to similarity as the notion of solidarity was 
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introduced.  In the similarity and difference between avatara and incarnation, solidarity itself 
appears to have a mediating role.  It allows for the claim that there is common ground to begin 
with, and when differences are discovered or brought together, solidarity with the other keeps 
difference from becoming division.   
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